COMPREHENSIVE PARADIGM SHIFTS

F Richard Singer III         edition date 12/07

website: www.conceptualstudy.org      email: richardsinger3@sbcglobal.net

Abstract: The early part of this paper is conceptual, presenting the concepts of a live option and a comprehensive paradigm. This part also sketches the concept of consciousness formulated by Julian Jaynes and relates his concept to the deliberate action concept from Descriptive Psychology. In this part, I am trying to formulate concepts that are clear enough to be a prelude to a careful examination of the reasons for various comprehensive paradigm shifts, and specifically how this relates to the general problem persons have in deciding what to do. Instead of such an examination, the rest of the paper merely gives my impressions about what it might reveal. I want to stress that these impressions are not based on research, that my speculations in this part are highly tentative, that I am not trying to establish any claims about reasons for comprehensive paradigm shifts. I am just indicating some conjectures that might be explored. Moreover, to narrow my conjectures about reasons for these shifts, I focus on reasons that might be relevant if the claims made by Jaynes about the origins of consciousness are essentially correct. A broader perspective on the future of comprehensive paradigms is the topic of another paper (Zeiger and Singer 2008), which does not consider Jaynes’ work. My reason for focusing on Jaynes work in this present paper is that it narrows the considerations to reasons that I find both interesting and at least moderately plausible. Whether or not Jaynes is correct about the origin of consciousness, I find the conceptual part of his work extremely useful. I also hope this might make it of interest to others who are intrigued by Jaynes’ work, even if they only find his claims at least slightly plausible. Anyone interested in his evidence should read his book with an open mind.

Nets: The term ‘net’ means a network of concepts and conceptual relationships that can be used to think about some realm of interest. While beliefs influence how a person uses a net, a net does not include beliefs. Singer (2008) gives a more extensive account of nets and related concepts.

Some Assumed Concepts: This presentation of the comprehensive paradigm uses a method taken from Descriptive Psychology, usually called a paradigm case formulation (Ossorio 2006). It also uses their {community, culture, social practice, institution} concepts. An understanding of ordinary usage of these terms should be sufficient for a basic understanding of the presentation. However, the term ‘culture’ has a number of ordinary meanings. For the purposes of this paper, a culture is a community whose members have an interdependent way of living. Moreover a culture is self-contained in the sense that, altho it may interact with other cultures, its institutions and social practices need little or no support outside of the culture. In addition, its institutions and practices provide the opportunity for these members to at least minimally satisfy all of their basic human needs and enhance their behavior potential in a multitude of realms of interest. A human need is called basic if failure to meet that need is likely to result in a notable loss of behavior potential.

SECTION 1: THE CONCEPTS

Live Options: Since the concept of doing that I am using includes anything a person is engaged in, we are always doing something. Before I awoke, I was sleeping. When I awoke, I folded the covers and put them in the chest. I did the part of my stretching exercises that I do on my bed. I stripped the sheets from the bed and put them in the washing machine. This is only a sample of many mundane things I did in the 45 minutes before I started to work on this paragraph. After writing for about an hour, I will eat an egg and cheese sandwich. Why do I do the things that I do? From William James I acquired the concept of a live option. A live option is not merely one we can imagine, but one that we might actually select. For some of the things I did, but not with others, I was aware of live options. I could leave the sheets on another day, but once removed I didn’t consider an alternative to washing them. How did I decide to remove the sheets? Once removed, why did I not even think about an option to washing them? On reflection, I could easily imagine other alternatives. It is simple to give superficial reasons for what I do. I eat because I am hungry, but I am hungry now and am not eating. Writing before eating is a habit, cultivated for reasons tedious to explain. What I will eat at that time involves prior thoughts about alternatives. I may even change my mind when I am ready to eat. Washing the sheets once they are removed is also a habit. I removed them today because I am leaving for a week and I might forget to do them when I return. Given any reason for action, it is usually possible to question the reason at a deeper level. Since the sheets did not look dirty, why wash them? I knew that they had not been washed for over a week, and I felt that I should have washed them before today. Why? It is good to have clean sheets. Why? They feel better and are healthier. Etc.

To the extent that doing involves live options, we can always question why we do what we do. Many of our reasons relate to our paradigms. My personal health paradigm is involved in washing my sheets, my stretching exercises, what I eat, etc. My answers to why I do these things can only make sense to others who can understand a similar paradigm. For anyone who cannot think about a connection between stretching and flexible muscles, my reasons for these exercises would make no sense.

Altho I can often explain what I do in terms of highly limited paradigms, this is not always adequate. I can explain why I write before eating in this manner, but not why I write about conceptual philosophy. Why I do so is related to the main concept of this paper, the concept referred to as a comprehensive paradigm. Briefly, a comprehensive paradigm involves a person’s most ubiquitous concepts and may influence anything a person might do or think about. Comprehensive paradigms also include beliefs or conjectures about the nature and origin of the universe and the way that persons fit into the general scheme of things. A comprehensive paradigm may apply only indirectly to most mundane things a person does, but it will apply directly to the more significant things that a person might do.

Scientific Paradigms: Since comprehensive paradigms share many features of those described by Thomas Kuhn, his ideas that are most relevant to this present paper will be sketched. See Kuhn (1970) or the outline of his book by Frank Pajares for more information. A scientific paradigm utilizes a net in relation to some realm of interest, but it goes beyond the net and includes all the shared core beliefs and commitments of some scientific community. Components may include theories, laws, rules, concepts, and definitions that go into generally accepted fundamentals of the science for that realm. Kuhn says that a scientific community cannot function without some set of received beliefs about these components, and that these core beliefs form the foundation that prepares for professional practice. In addition, the nature of the preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs exert a deep hold on the student’s mind. The community presumes to know what its realm of interest is like and takes great pains to defend that assumption. Minor challenges to the core will be either ignored or ridiculed, but a serious one coming from an alternative paradigm, or could give rise to one, provokes a serious counterattack.

Note: The concept of a belief includes the concept of a disbelief. For instance, that there is no such thing as a random event was a core belief in the paradigm for classical physics.

Versions: A paradigm is not a static state of affairs, nor need it be so tightly unified that it cannot tolerate the existence of different versions. Differences within a paradigm, i.e. those compatible with its core, are expected and are considered as a source of vitality. Such differences may be settled using criteria of the paradigm. In so doing, this provides more conviction for those committed to the paradigm. It may also give rise to a more developed version of the paradigm. What cannot be tolerated is a threat to core components, altho even these may gradually evolve while retaining what is considered their essential characteristics.

Example: Copernicus argued that the planets move around the sun. This radical challenge to the accepted Ptolemaic paradigm was strongly resisted. His argument from simplicity was deemed epistemologically irrelevant. The Copernican account kept the idea that astronomical motion involved perfect circles. Using simplicity criteria, Kepler claimed that orbits were elliptical. While Copernicus was creating a new astronomical paradigm, Kepler was working within this new paradigm, retaining its heliocentric core and its simplicity criteria. His difference with Copernicus, rather than challenging the paradigm, was instrumental in its development. Later Newton was able to provide additional criteria, namely his laws of motion and the ability to mathematically deduce elliptical orbits from these laws. Altho Newton added important new epistemological criteria to the core, he was merely using a more developed version of the Heliocentric Paradigm that could be integrated with a new paradigm for physics. The simplicity and richness of Newton’s view was decisive.

Comprehensive Paradigms: The presentation of this concept will begin with a general model case of a comprehensive paradigm. This will be followed by some allowable transformations. These yield additional cases of comprehensive paradigms that are not instances of the model case. As a prelude, some features of two specific instances of this model case are superficially sketched. These are primarily intended to make it easier to follow the general model case, which merely differ from these instances by omitting details irrelevant to the concept. I also sketch a comprehensive paradigm that is not an instance of the model case. Since I am an outsider to these paradigms, my sketches may not be totally faithful. However, an accurate sketch is not essential for illustrating the comprehensive paradigm concept.

The Medieval Catholic Paradigm: Paradigms evolve, so I sketch this paradigm, as it may have been when it dominated Europe. I think that most of these features were retained in newer versions. The realm of interest for this comprehensive paradigm includes everything. This means that altho it may not explicitly focus attention on various matters, it influences everything that its adherents do and think about, and there is no act or thought that cannot be judged by the paradigm. The paradigm’s primary core belief is in an omnipotent and omniscient God, who exists in a spiritual realm outside of the physical universe, but whose spirit also permeates this world he created, which is subject to his will in all ways. He has established His Church and its sacraments as the community for meeting spiritual needs for all who would be saved. The core epistemological belief is that God has revealed his will to the extent that humanity needs to know it, and that he has established His Church as the final authority for interpreting his will. His Church is a guardian of true knowledge about the nature of reality and the nature of good and evil and humanity’s place in the universe. All other means of knowing are subject to error, and knowledge of even the most insignificant nature cannot be true if it is incompatible in any way with God’s revelation. The paradigm has strong prescriptive implications. All norms and social practices are subject to God’s judgment. The correct social and political organizations for maintaining these are rooted in his will. However, God gave humans free will and they may make sinful choices. This cannot thwart his will, which of necessity must prevail, and persons will be judged for their actions and beliefs. As with everything else, His Church is the voice of God on earth and has authority to pass judgment in such matters.

Note: The above instance of a comprehensive paradigm is a branch of a religion. Almost any other branch of a traditional religion could have been used for this purpose. The next instance of the model case of comprehensive paradigms is one that would not usually be classified as a religion.
The Imperial Roman Paradigm: I sketch this paradigm as it may have been during the time of the late republic and the early empire. These features are taken from casual readings rather than a historical study. At that time, Rome had already acquired much of its empire. As with the Medieval Catholic Paradigm, its realm of interest includes everything, altho it is much less demanding about many matters. Its primary core involved a belief in the superiority of the Roman traditions and Roman institutions. This was independent of any religious beliefs and had little or nothing to do to do with any broader ontology. However, the paradigm had a religious component consisting more of religious practices than beliefs. It recognized the importance of these practices within both the Roman community and in the other communities within its empire. Colleen McCullough wrote a sequence of novels set in the late republic. See McCullough (1990) for the first of these. If her perspective is correct, then the Roman gods were more like forces of nature than like persons and could be addressed using any names. Moreover, she indicates that Romans believed that man’s place in the universe was limited to his time in this world, and that he became a mindless shade upon death. Thus this paradigm allowed for many polytheistic religions within the empire, regarding the differences as inessential as long as the authority of Rome was acknowledged. The specific details of these were not what held the empire together. What could not be tolerated were any beliefs that placed anything above the authority of Rome. Thus the Romans had a problem with Jews and Christians, who looked beyond Rome to what they regarded as a higher law. The core epistemological belief is that what is substantiated by Roman tradition is what is true and sacred, and that Roman institutions can interpret this tradition. The paradigm has strong prescriptive implications for Roman citizens. All norms and social practices are subject to Roman authority and the correct social and political organization of society for maintaining them are rooted in Roman tradition. It also has prescriptive implications for subject peoples and allies. Part of the ontology of Roman superiority entailed Rome’s right to impose its will on others. This determines their obligations to Rome, but leaves them considerable latitude with regard to their social practices and institutions.

The Non-Doctrinal Religious Paradigm: About the middle of the 20^th century there emerged a perspective that spread among mainline Protestant clergy and later among some liberal Catholics. It retained the ethical components of the gospels and played down or discarded traditional doctrines. Its outlook was highly ecumenical, easily accommodating other religious perspectives that were willing to mute doctrinal considerations. It had no quarrel with Reformed Judaism or Buddhism, altho they different historical traditions. These and some others could now be considered as different versions of a single Non-Doctrinal Religious Paradigm. Since this paradigm lacks an uncompromising ontology, it is not an instance of the model case. In fact, it would seem to have mostly vague ontological beliefs, with great tolerance for differences among its adherents. Likewise its epistemological commitments seem vague, altho it involves a distinction about how obtain knowledge of the spiritual realm and the temporal realm. This seems to entail a belief we can obtain knowledge about the realm of values and the human condition by our ability to use the collective wisdom of the ages in interpreting and understanding our human experiences. On the other hand, a large amount our knowledge comes from observations that could be tested more empirically; such as how processes work, what events have occurred, information about a multitude of states of affairs, etc. Unlike physicalistic paradigms, this paradigm provides a strong and long-standing foundation for values. Indeed, the core of this paradigm takes its value-foundation component from the common values of the world’s great religions, recognizing their common values of these as having an objective foundation. It claims that these values have emerged from elements that are universal to the human experience. This can be vaguely related to
some form of higher power for good in the world, which would seem to be its main ontological commitment that is not merely physicalistic. This higher power may be called God, leaving it unclear as to whether or not God is a person or some impersonal form of higher power for good. Whatever differences in beliefs there are about such matters, there is agreement that traditional theistic ontological beliefs about sin and damnation are untenable.
The Model Case of a Comprehensive Paradigm: One feature distinguishing a comprehensive paradigm from a limited one is that it presupposes some of the most significant concepts from some fundamental net, and thus it cannot even be understood by someone using a radically different fundamental net. Another distinguishing feature is that its core concerns are broader than are those in a limited paradigm, as are its prescriptive attitudes towards behavior. In fact, nothing goes beyond its realm of interest, and for a person who accepts the paradigm, it may influence anything that person might do or think about. A person for whom this is the case is called an adherent of the paradigm. Being an adherent can vary from active to passive. An adherent is active to the extent that the adherent has internalized the paradigm and endorses it beliefs and practices. A passive adherent may only pretend to endorse its beliefs and may follow its practices primarily to avoid sanctions. The model case has the features listed below, with most of feature (1) being essential to the concept.

(1) The paradigm has a set of primary core beliefs about how things are, and these are considered essential. One of its core components is an uncompromising ontology that implies what can and what must exist. To be uncompromising means that while other ontological claims might be intellectually acknowledged, no others are live options. Connected to this ontology are beliefs about the origin of the universe, the nature of reality, humanities place in the universe. Another of its core components is a set of epistemological beliefs that govern acceptable practices for obtaining and verifying what is and can be known about core beliefs and anything related to them. These epistemological beliefs need not be explicitly stated or systematically formulated. They may even be as loose as an appeal to tradition.

(2) Its core beliefs provide a foundation for the value priorities of the adherents. This includes ways for thinking about human activity and criteria for making value judgments about such activity. This has strong prescriptive implications for personal behavior norms, especially those involving ethical or moral principles. This aspect of the paradigm is the one that is most essential to stability for its community of adherents. Many of that community’s social practices and institutions are organized around it, and it provides a rationale and support for these practices and institutions, including means for making judgment about any practice or institution.

(3) The paradigm has sufficient influence to have a major impact on some culture for generations, primarily by being internalized by influential members of a consequential community in the culture. It thus provides internal cohesiveness and unity and stability and a sense of security and wellbeing for that community.

(4) The paradigm will be strongly defended by active adherents if it is seriously challenged from without, and adherents who seriously challenge its core components will be severely sanctioned.

Allowable Transformations: These transformations allow for comprehensive paradigms that do not fit the model case, such as the Non-Doctrinal Religious Paradigm described above and The Pure Physicalistic Paradigm to be described shortly.

In (1) weaken uncompromising in respect to ontology, and even allow for ontological considerations rather than an ontology. Change epistemological beliefs to epistemological standards or epistemological considerations.

Omit (2) or weaken it in any way.

Change culture in (3) to any group of persons or even a single person, and allow its impact and the duration of its influence to be smaller. Allow different communities to have versions of the same paradigm. Weaken (3) by omitting cohesiveness or unity or stability.

Weaken (4) by changing strongly defended to something like defended. Allow for more, or even considerable, challenges or reservations from adherents.

The Pure Physicalistic Paradigm: When asked where God fits in to his celestial mechanics, Laplace answered that he had no need for that hypothesis. Not long after, Comte formulated a philosophy called Positivism. This was the beginning of a paradigm widely embraced by influential people in a community of intellectuals. We can call it the Pure Physicalistic Paradigm, because its core ontological component claims that everything is physical. Currently this means that space-time behaves according to the laws of contemporary physics (to the extent that these are correct), that nothing exists except the physical universe, etc. The epistemic core of this paradigm is empiricism, with reliable knowledge obtainable using some version of the scientific method. Altho many adherents of this paradigm have similar views about human behavior and social institution, this does not seem be essential to its primary core. Altho this paradigm has had a major cultural impact, its active adherents form a relatively small minority even in the cultures of its origin.

This paradigm is not an instance of the model case. To classify it as a comprehensive paradigm, omit or at least significantly weaken feature (2), especially in regard prescriptive components being part of a unified core. Also weaken feature (4) by omitting severely.

The Marxist Paradigm: As proposed by Marx, the core of this comprehensive paradigm was dialectical materialism, and Marx thought of history as unfolding in deterministic fashion. Altho his paradigm may not have had a complete ontology at its core, current versions would probably include the ontology of the physicalistic paradigm. The class struggle was considered as economic, and this was conceptualized in material terms. In particular, his ontology explicitly rejected the existence of anything supernatural. Unlike a purely physicalistic paradigm, the core of this paradigm explicitly includes feature (2). Thus the Marxist Paradigm is an example of an augmented physicalistic paradigm.

The Traditional Christian Paradigm: Altho the Orthodox and Catholic paradigms could be classified as versions of a single paradigm, this was not the case for the Catholic and Protestant paradigms just after the reformation. Many differences between traditional Protestants and traditional Catholics have now been muted, perhaps enough to imagine a comprehensive paradigm that is an instance of the model case. The adherents of this Traditional Christian Paradigm include those who want to conserve what they consider core Christian components. They regard divine revelation as real and fundamental, maintain traditional attitudes towards sin, believe that Jesus is the Son of God sent to save us from sin thru his death on the cross, believe that he rose from the dead, etc. Different versions of this paradigm differ primarily in regards to institutional versus individual authority in interpreting God’s will. Modifications retaining the ethical components of the gospels, but discarding or playing down other traditional beliefs are not versions of this paradigm.

The Traditional Hindu Paradigm: Traditional Hinduism espouses a well-ordered universe in which the Religion and the government are thoroughly integrated. There is a place for everyone and everyone is in his place. The rules and principles are laid out explicitly in the Vedas, and implicitly in the epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. Hindu ontology includes a rich pantheon of gods, presumably created by aggregating local deities as the empire added regions, but each scripture identifies one of them with supreme consciousness. Thus claims that Hinduism is monotheistic and claims that it is polytheistic can both be defended. It is also rich in rituals for a wide range of occasions when external support is called for. We could tentatively characterize Hinduism as an umbrella religion, embracing a large number of sects with rather different doctrines. However in common, Hindu ontology provides universal justice via the notions of karma and reincarnation. Physical aspects of the paradigm receive much less attention than in the west, so conflicts with the physical sciences are correspondingly subdued. Psychosocial aspects of the paradigm are correspondingly emphasized, with the result that some Hindu scholars regard western psychology as naïve and simplistic.

Note: Several other comprehensive paradigms are given in Zeiger and Singer (2008).

Versions: The main consideration for thinking of different paradigms as versions of some looser paradigm is whether the looser paradigm has sufficient unity. The most relevant criterion is how adherents of these regard each other. For instance, the predominant comprehensive paradigm for the Byzantine Empire was the shared core beliefs and commitments of the Orthodox Church. We could think of Medieval Christianity as involving two main paradigms. Since these two paradigms have enough of a common core, using the transformation (3) which allows a paradigm to cross cultures, we could also regard them as versions of a single looser Christian Paradigm. Whether this is appropriate depends not on how an outside observer feels about the commonality of these paradigms, but on the extent to which active adherents of the paradigms would consider these differences as essential.

After the reformation, there were several culturally significant comprehensive paradigms in Europe, such as the Lutheran Paradigm and the Calvinistic Paradigm. These would likely be regarded by adherents as different versions of the Protestant Paradigm. However, adherents might have been reluctant to classify the Catholic and Protestant paradigms of that time as merely alternative versions of a single Christian Paradigm. Altho the core differences may not seem too great to an outsider, they were deemed significant enough by adherents of these paradigms to give rise to extreme hostilities. Currently, it seems appropriate to classify the traditional Catholic and Protestant paradigms as alternative versions of a single Traditional Christian Paradigm, or at least as evolving towards one. The Christian version of the Non-Doctrinal Paradigm would not be considered as a version of the Traditional Christian Paradigm, and would not be considered as even Christian by some of its adherents. Zeiger and Singer (2008) reflect on a scenario in which the major traditional religious paradigms evolve towards being a version of some single traditional religious paradigm.

Subjective Consciousness: Jaynes claims that extensive civilizations existed prior to the origin of consciousness. A barrier to a serious consideration of his claim is the difficulty in imagining how people in civilizations could act without being conscious. This is complicated by the fact that what Jaynes means by consciousness may not be what the word means to the reader. In fact, this word has been used for concepts that Jaynes takes great pains to show are not necessary aspects of consciousness. To avoid any possible semantic confusion, I will use the term ‘subjective consciousness’ for the concept of consciousness used by Jaynes. Jaynes does an excellent job of laying the conceptual groundwork with his discussion on the nature of consciousness. However much of his discussion focuses first on what is wrong with prior views about consciousness, and he refers to his work as a theory of consciousness. Thus I initially missed the purely conceptual aspect of his work, and so I want to stress that this part of it is entirely independent of any theory about how the human mind works or about the origins of consciousness. All page references that follow are for Jaynes (1990).

Subjective consciousness is a concept. Thus it is neither true nor false, but more or less useful for some purposes. I will sketch the six features Jaynes gives for the concept of subjective consciousness, namely {spatialization, excerption, the analog-I, the metaphor-me, narratization, conciliation}. For more detail, see pages 59-65.

Spatialization refers to our assumption of a metaphorical mind-space in which we separate the things we consider as if they were individual objects. Spatialization applies not only to things that have spatial qualities in the physical world. It applies to whatever we think about. We use the metaphor of seeing for abstract entities, which we separate out so that we can see how they are related. For instance, I might say that I see several reasons why I need to get more exercise. We spatialize time, viewing years as laid out in succession, usually from left to right.

Since we can only pay attention to part of a thing at any one moment, we never see any state of affairs in its entirety. Excerption involves thinking of an object or event or state of affairs in terms of some of its limited aspects. Just now thinking of my garden, I see leaves covering part of it, weeds among the onions and garlic, some pepper plants. At another time, I might see other features. Of course, this seeing is in my mind-space, for I do this without looking at my garden.

The central feature of subjective consciousness is the analog-I, which is the metaphor we have of ourselves. The analog-I moves about in our imagination doing things we are not actually doing. It also forms excerptions of things we have done. Without this analog-I, we might have live options, but we could not select among them using what we might imagine as alternative outcomes. Deliberate action would not be possible. Shall I weed the garlic early this afternoon? It will be in the sun at that time, but if I only do one patch, I can go cool off in the creek before I get too uncomfortable. On the other hand, I can go to the creek first and get gravel to repair the road.

The analog-I looks out at some state of affairs and imagines acting within or upon it. We can also step back, observe the actions and think about what would be happening to us. The metaphor-me is the passive version of ourselves that we observe in our mind-space. I imagine the analog-I weeding the garlic and going to the creek. I imagine the metaphor-me getting hot and becoming cool in the creek.

Our analog-I sees itself as the main figure in a story that takes place in our spatialized time. Narratization is the process of telling ourselves this story about what we are doing and about how the facts we notice fit in with this. Narratization explains why we did what we did or why we might select alternatives. It provides a rationale for how we might act in novel situations as they arise.

Conciliation is the process of bringing perceptions together as conscious recognizable objects. It does so in a way that makes excerpts from these stimuli compatible with each other and our ongoing narratization. Conciliation does in the mind space what narratization does in mind-time.

Subjective Consciousness and Deliberate Action: Jaynes’ concept of subjective consciousness refers to a feature of human experience so ubiquitous that I did not realize that I had never adequately conceptualized it. It was not until I encountered the purely conceptual presentation of the behavior description concept from Descriptive Psychology that I considered a purely conceptual perspective on what Jaynes had said about the nature of consciousness. A deliberate action description is one in which the actor knows alternative actions and has the ability to imagine their outcomes. I find it helpful to relate the concepts of subjective consciousness and deliberate action. The concept of subjective consciousness could be briefly characterized as the ability to routinely engage in deliberate action.

In saying that deliberate action is a ubiquitous feature of our experience, I only mean that when we reflect on what we are doing, we can usually imagine alternatives. It is easy to realize that a large amount of what we do doesn’t directly involve considering alternatives. I put on my walking shoes, walk east on my road until I come to a side trail, turn on this trail and avoid stepping in a large puddle a short distance down this trail, etc. I do most of my walk without considering alternatives. What I find hard to imagine is that I might do all of this and not even be able to imagine alternatives or consider what it might be like to select from them. However after extended daily contact with a close friend suffering from hallucinations, I begin to partially realize how this is possible. I also begin to examine my dreams to see to what extent I could think in terms of deliberate action while dreaming. Except for the occasions when I could spot that I was dreaming, I found myself dreaming of a vast amount of activity that was totally devoid of deliberate action. This encouraged me to read Jaynes again, and what emerged was a higher plausibility attitude towards his bicameral mind thesis and a renewed interest in the emergence of consciousness. See the appendix for how my plausibility attitude shifted.

What-To-Do Problems: Planets revolve around the sun. Rivers flow towards the sea. Leaves fall from trees and later decay. Fish spawn. Hearts beat. I would find it strange to think of any of these events as involving deliberate action. There is no need for subjective consciousness for these events to happen. Nor is there any other need for subjective consciousness for a vast number of events to occur without any what-to-do problems (my terminology, not used by Jaynes). With animal behavior, we may think about what-to-do problems. A squirrel comes into my yard, is chased by my dog, quickly climbs the nearest tree, etc. The squirrel could have stayed outside the fence. My dog could have ignored it. The squirrel could have confronted my dog. Of course, it is only in the mind space of my subjective consciousness that I imagine these animals as having these options. I do not think my dog or the squirrel considered such options. Neither of them seemed to have a problem about what to do. To have a what-to-do problem, there must be something giving rise to some hesitation in that situation.

In perplexing situations, there can be what-to-do problems. An extreme example can be illustrated by the medieval paradox of Buridan’s Ass. This imaginary ass, being placed equally between two bails of hay and being pulled equally in two directions, does not know what to do. Ultimately it starves to death in spite of having an abundant supply of food available. Of course, implementing such a condition was beyond their technical expertise, so an empirical test was not performed. More seriously, perhaps only humans have a multitude of what-to-do problems. It takes only a little reflection on what we do to indicate that most of us encounter many such problems, altho most of them are exceedingly minor. Situations need not be perplexing in order for a what-to-do problem to occur. They merely need to involve live options, as do most situations. When these options are recognized, there will be at least a minor what-to-do problem. These are most likely to be problematic when these live options seem appealing for reasons involving some degree of complexity. Since this is the main reason that most of us encounter such problems, and since subjective consciousness is what we normally use to deal with them, it may be hard to imagine that cultures could have existed in which people were not subjectively conscious.

A little reflection indicates that what-to-do problems can occur without any awareness of live options. Being unconsciously drawn towards two incompatible actions is one source of what-to-do problems. Unlike the hay paradox, these are unlikely to result in a behavioral breakdown. A little reflection or just waiting around, some solution will emerge. A problem leading to frustration and no related action is more likely to occur when nothing that we can imagine doing seems acceptable. Usually this does not lead to a general behavioral breakdown, but under some circumstances, this is a possibility. There are various ways we avoid being overwhelmed by too many what-to-do problems. Habits and attitudes allow automatic solutions to many potential what-to-do problems. Given our attitude towards mosquitoes, we have no problem in trying to swat them. Of course, habits and attitudes can lead to unsatisfactory solution. Paradigms also help us avoid problems. My paradigm for physical wellbeing screens me from the problem of whether or not to have an exercise program, and once the program is established, my habits often screen me from the problem of whether or not to walk on any given day.

Since a comprehensive paradigm can influence anything we do or think about, it can be extremely important in relation to what-to-do problems. It can help maintain the more limited paradigms that support the ordinary habits and attitudes that reduce the number of what-to-do problems we might otherwise encounter. However it is not merely the quantity of what-to-do problems that might be overwhelming. A person can be overwhelmed by a single significant problem. Since one of the major roles played by a comprehensive paradigm is that of supporting values, it can play a major role in choosing a course of action in relation to a problem that is potentially overwhelming.

Example: Shortly after I began working on this part of the paper, I took a walk and found myself thinking about these ideas. I realized that I was on my way back, and that I had turned around without considering the option of going further. I had initially planned to walk 2½ miles, so going beyond the 1¼ mark had not been a live option. I walk 6 days a week for a total of 15 miles. This influenced my initial decision to walk 2½ miles, but it is not a sufficient reason for this decision. The next day I considered walking 3 miles instead of 2½. Was this a live option or merely an imaginary one? It seemed live, because it had some appeal. My blood sugar had been high that morning, and some extra exercise might be useful. On the other hand, the extra walking would cut into the time I would be working on moving rocks, and that exercise would probably do just as much to lower my blood sugar. However, it was Tuesday and walking further would place me ahead for the week. All of a sudden, thinking about options had presented me with a what-to-do problem, and while I considered the decision trivial, the very fact of thinking about this topic made it difficult for me to decide which option to select. I could have resolved this by completing the 2½ miles and then seeing what impulse was stronger at that time or I could try to resolve the problem sooner. Oh my, another trivial what-to-do problem! I decided to resolve it by the equivalent of flipping a coin. I would walk the extra distance if and only if the next car I saw was going in the direction I was then walking. It came from the opposite direction so I decided to stay with my original decision. I also realized that I did not need to abide by the result of this coin toss.

Altho solving a what-to-do problem by a coin toss might occasionally be suitable for making a choice where the difference in outcomes seems trivial, this is not the strategy we normally adopt. Often we briefly consider alternatives and make some choice that seems currently suitable. Key to this is spotting that for many problems the difference in outcomes is trivial, altho since humans tend to make mountains out of molehills, this is not always easy. Of course, there are what-to-do problems in which these differences can be important enough to matter. It may not matter whether I walked 2½ or 3 miles Tuesday, but it would matter somewhat if I skipped Tuesday. This would mean that I would have to think about how to complete the 15-mile week in some other manner, and this would be unpleasant. I could solve the problem of how to meet this week’s goal by ignoring it, but this could begin to undermine my solution to a serious problem about managing my diabetes. I mention this to stress that avoiding what-to-do problems is one of the main things we do to make life manageable. This prevents our subjective consciousness from being confronted with too many problems.

Altho much of what I do does not immediately depend on subjective consciousness, it feels as if subjective consciousness is involved in everything I do. Walking 2 miles is seldom a live option to walking 2½ miles, but establishing this 2½-mile minimum clearly involved subjective consciousness. The habit of brushing my teeth may have been acquired because I was so instructed, and I suspect I never considered an option to this habit. Of course options still occur, to use my water pick or my sonic brush at a particular time. This trivial what-to-do problem is mostly solved by impulse rather than by deliberation, and the habit of using both the pick and the brush in the morning and only the brush in the evening seems to be emerging. In spite of these reflections, it is hard to imagine living effectively without subjective consciousness. Yet a little reflection shows us that most living things manage to do what they do without subjective consciousness. In fact, altho narrative language is conceptually necessary for subjective consciousness, it is not sufficient. According to Jaynes, bicameral individuals coped with what-to-do problems using language in a way that did not involve subjective consciousness. Even if we do not find his account of bicameral civilizations even barely plausible, it is easy to see that we do use language to remind ourselves of what to do without recourse to subjective consciousness. Having earlier explored options, I merely tell myself to turn around as I reach the halfway point. Later when I reach the porch, I automatically remind myself to get the door key.

SECTION 2: PAST PARADIGM SHIFTS

Application: I am finished with the conceptual presentation. I should note that my interest in clarifying these concepts is greater than in any particular use for them. However concepts are acquired primarily thru use rather than thru any form of presentation. Thus the rest of this paper sketches one application that I have for these concepts. Altho I could select other applications, as in Singer and Zeiger (2008), being intrigued with the work of Julian Jaynes, I decided to use these concepts in relation to his theory. Assuming that Jaynes is correct about the origins of subjective consciousness, I relate this to what it might suggest about several major comprehensive paradigm shifts. I do not claim that this assumption is correct, but making it gives one way to think about some factors that might have been involved in past comprehensive paradigm shifts. Clearly what is presented is incomplete. Moreover the reasons given may be incorrect if subjective consciousness had an origin that differs radically from what Jaynes has claimed. So I also reflect briefly on reasons for these shifts assuming that Jaynes is incorrect and subjective consciousness evolved much earlier.

The Origin of Subjective Consciousness: As far as I know, Jaynes’ theory of the origin of subjective consciousness (Jaynes1990) is the only one that has been worked out in a high level of detail. Understanding his position could be useful in formulating a detailed alternative, and especially in formulating a more evolutionary biological one. I am not going to present or discuss very much of what Jaynes has said. Instead, I will include a number of excerpts from his book and indicate some of the questions this has raised for me. I will say that according to Jaynes, the immediate predecessors to subjectively conscious individuals were bicameral ones. What they were like is introduced in the chapter entitled Mind of the Iliad. I take this (and further descriptions) as a conceptualization. Altho Jaynes claims that the men in the Iliad were bicameral, his conceptualization does not depend on these claims. Whether or not there were complex bicameral civilizations, as Jaynes tries to demonstrate, the concept of a bicameral man qualifies at least as a tool for speculating about the origins of subjective consciousness in a way that meshes easily with some comprehensive paradigm shifts.

As a prelude to his theory, Jaynes indicates that syntactic language involves more than signs and signals. It uses nouns and verbs. It applies modifiers. Syntactic language is necessary for narratization, and hence subjective consciousness is impossible without it. On this Jaynes is correct, merely on conceptual grounds. Thus, there must have been a time in which people lived without subjective consciousness. It was this realization that draws me back to Julian Jaynes and to the central concern of his work.

How and why did subjective consciousness emerge?

It must have emerged after language became complex enough to be syntactic. Perhaps it emerged gradually and became more prevalent as language evolved. Initially I found this more plausible than his account, and I will take this as the alternative that I will contrast with his. He claims instead that for many millenniums language provided a radically different way of dealing with what-to-do problems. He calls the mentality involved the bicameral mind, claiming that subjective consciousness originated due to the breakdown of the bicameral mind. Jaynes proposes that language evolved as a means of social control in groups in which continual direct contact with the leader was often not possible. He says that one of the major mechanisms involved was auditory hallucination. Jaynes asks us to imagine a man from a prehistoric small group culture who is sent to do some task that is not routine or habitual. Suppose he is to set up a fish weir that is upstream far from the group. How does he keep at this time-consuming task all afternoon? Without language, he would forget what he was doing and why it needed to be done. A lingual man could use language for this purpose. If he is not subjectively conscious, he cannot deliberately remind his analog-I of what he is to do. Instead, he can be kept at the task by a continual verbal hallucination telling him what to do. Jaynes claims that this is the origin of auditory hallucinations, and that these were at first casually anonymous and not very significant.

I do not have enough information to find any account of the emergence of subjective consciousness highly plausible. However, I now find Jaynes’ account more plausible than any proposed alternatives. I will take Jaynes’ theory as the working hypothesis for one account of the reasons for comprehensive paradigm shifts. This hypothesis assumes that people lived for millennia without subjective consciousness, with auditory hallucinations playing a major role in telling people what to do in novel situations. I do find this at least somewhat plausible. However, even if I only found it barely plausible, it would be of interest as a possible account of early paradigm shifts. For even if Jaynes is wrong in all respects, his work at least offers one explanation for why comprehensive paradigms in the past differed considerably from current ones.

As I indicated above, I will also consider that subjective consciousness emerged gradually and became more prevalent as language evolved. Under this assumption, there is no need subjective consciousness could keep a member of the group engaged in a time consuming task while away from the group. Auditory hallucination would not be needed, altho being authoritative, they might be more effective. Given subjective consciousness, the possibility of doing something else is always present. However auditory hallucinations and subjective consciousness are not incompatible. An individual may at time utilize subjective consciousness to decide what to do, while at other times follow the dictates of the voices directing his behavior. This clearly occurs with some persons suffering from schizophrenia. In our culture this is problematic. This may not have always been the case, If Jaynes is correct, there were bicameral civilizations in which following the commands of auditory hallucinations was not only normal, it was the main mechanism of social control and of deciding what to do in novel situations. My alternative hypothesis assumes that auditory hallucination were taken as normal and played a stabilizing social role, but that subjective consciousness developed much earlier than Jaynes imagined and that its level was sufficient to cope with a multitude of minor what-to-do problems. For the sake of simplicity, I will not consider other alternatives that could be imagined.

The rest of this paper is highly tentative,
altho the style in which it is written may not indicate this.

Animistic Paradigms: In an animistic paradigm, nothing is inanimate in our sense, and so a conceptual distinction that we use routinely has not even been formulated. Such a paradigm uses an ontology that considers everything as alive. A soul or spiritual being is attributed to all entities, including those we now think of as inanimate. Furthermore these innumerable spiritual entities are concerned with human affairs and can help or harm our interests. They consider this indwelling spirit as separable from the body, as able to go away and leave it insensible or dead, and to appear to others in dreams or visions. They believed spirits capable of entering animals and plants, and even objects, like weapons and clothing and food. They can possess these entities, acting within them. Since the world religions have all evolved in historic times, many scholars assume that animistic paradigms dominated the globe in the prehistoric era and that possibly all religions came from this type of belief. If this is so then we may regard these prehistoric paradigms as indicative of an attitude that did not regard people as significantly different from other entities.

Since I can only claim a limited understanding of animistic paradigm, I speculate only briefly on what they are like and the relation between animistic paradigms and what-to-do problems. It seems at least clear that animism provides a stable tradition about how the world works and how things are done. Perhaps feeling akin to everything makes for a kind of acceptance of events that avoids many such problems. Animism seems to have been prevalent mainly in cultures of the hunter-gatherer type or very primitive agriculture or herding, and so I limit my comment to my understanding of what such cultures may have been like.

To the extent that activities in such cultures were simple or immediate, what-to-do would also be simple and immediate. With most situations not involving live options, novel what-to-do problems would be infrequent, and especially when compared to the vast number of options most of us are accustomed to. Neither auditory hallucinations nor subjective consciousness would be needed to cope with most of what was being done. Language also plays another role that would assist with such problems, namely the stories and myths that carry within them traditional ways of coping with certain type of situations.

Even in such cultures, some novel situations are bound to occur, and this would give rise to at least some minor what-to-do problems. Jaynes speculates that one of the main what-to-do problems related to keeping at time-consuming tasks for which there was no immediate positive reinforcement. He believes that casual auditory hallucinations would provide a way of dealing with such problems. That some people do hear voices is beyond dispute, but currently this is considered abnormal and believing that the voices are authoritative is considered as delusional. Considering the hearing of voices as normal would be easily compatible with an animistic paradigm, and these voices would provide an authoritative answer about what action to take. Of course, almost any level of subjective consciousness would also provide an answer about what action to take, and this could easily be reinforced by learned cultural traditions that emphasize the individual’s duty to the welfare of the group.

Animism also provides a means of dealing with more significant what-to-do problems. Consider the spiritual quests related to coming of age. In such a quest, it was expected that the person would be told something significant about the direction of his life. To the extent that this involved voices that were heard as if coming from without, auditory hallucinations could account for this practice. On the other hand, solitary meditation by mystics has also provided direction to a person’s life, and this can occur without auditory hallucinations.

In a culture with an animistic paradigm, hearing spirits was not restricted to special people. It was assumed that at times anyone would be able to do so. This at least suggests that hallucinations could have played a wider role than they play in our contemporary world. An individual today who routinely has auditory hallucinations is likely to be classified as mentally ill. In an animistic culture such individuals may be considered as more highly blessed.

Manifest Polytheism: Regardless of whether Jaynes is correct about many ancient civilizations being bicameral, it is clear that idols played an extremely significant role in these civilizations. His account reminded me of this feature of antiquity, which had always puzzled me. Their gods were not in the heavens. They were close at hand. This feature suggested calling this paradigm type Manifest Polytheism, and it is this that most distinguishes this paradigm from the Remote Polytheistic Paradigm that came later. In Remote Polytheism, the gods speak only under special circumstance. In Manifest Polytheism, a god is in the idol and it speaks directly to the individual.

Ancient Egyptian Civilization seemed to be dominated by comprehensive paradigms providing an extremely high level of cohesion and whose manifest polytheistic ontological beliefs were central to its social practices. Many other ancient civilizations in Mesopotamia, India, China, and Mesoamerica seemed to have similar comprehensive paradigms. Jaynes claims that these were bicameral civilizations. What they were like is introduced in the chapter entitled Mind of the Iliad. I take this (and his further descriptions) as a conceptualization. Altho Jaynes claims that the men in the Iliad were bicameral, his conceptualization does not depend on his claims. Whether or not there were complex bicameral civilizations, as Jaynes tries to demonstrate, these civilizations had comprehensive paradigms that regarded their gods as living close at hand. If he actually is correct, this would account for their extremely high level of cohesion, a level beyond anything achieved in later cultures.

Jaynes claims that the main way adherents of such paradigms dealt with novel complex what-to-do problems was by hallucinating the voices of these gods, and that the major institutions and social practices were organized around these voices. Chapters 1 and 2 of Book II give an extensive account of Manifest Polytheism. I give some modified excerpts from these chapters to indicate their main features. I begin with older cultures and then focus on Mesopotamia.

Imagine ourselves as strangers in an unknown land. Its settlements are all organized on a similar plan, ordinary houses and buildings grouped around one larger more magnificent dwelling. We would assume this magnificent one was the house of the ruler. And we might be right. But in these older cultures, this ruler was not a person. Rather he was a hallucinated presence, or in the more general case, a statue with a table in front of him where people could place their offerings to him. (page 150)

The burial of the important dead as if they were still living is common to almost all of these older cultures. As these early ones developed into kingdoms, these graves are more and more filled with weapons, furniture, ornaments and particularly vessels of food. The kings of Ur were entombed with their entire retinues in a crouched position around them as for service. (page 161)

A third feature of primitive civilizations that I take to be indicative of bicamerality is the enormous number and kind of human effigies and their obvious centrality to ancient life. The first were the propped up corpses of chiefs, or their remodeled skulls. But thereafter they developed into a vast number of figurines and idols found in every household. (page 165)

Thruout Mesopotamia, the gods owned all the lands and men were their slaves. Each city-state had its own principal god and the king was described as the tenant farmer of the god. The god was a statue. This statue was not of the god, but was the god himself. He had his own house in the center of a complex of temple buildings, a great rectangular tower rising by diminishing stages to a shining summit. The first duty of the steward-king was to serve the god, not only in the administration of the god’s estates, but also in personal ways. The god liked eating and drinking, music and dancing. They required a bed to sleep in and for enjoying sex with other god-statues from time to time. They had to be washed and dressed. They had to be taken out for state occasion. All of these were done with increasing ceremony and ritual as time went on. (pages 178-179)

How is all this possible, continuing as it did in some form for thousands of years as the central focus of life, unless we posit that humans heard the statues speak to them, and even had to hear them speak to know what to do. (page 180)

But the ordinary citizen did not hear the voices of the great gods who owned the cities; for this would have weakened the political fabric. He served these gods, but appealed to them only in some great crisis, and then only thru intermediaries. These intermediaries were the personal gods, whose voices he heard and obeyed. In almost every house excavated, there existed a shrine-room that contained idols or figurines as the inhabitant’s personal gods. (page184)

To indicate the manifest nature of this paradigm I give another excerpt from Jaynes. He describes Hammurabi receiving a judgement from his god Marduk, as carved on the top of a stele.

The god is seated on a raised mound. Hammurabi listens intently as he stands just below him. The god holds in his right hand the attributes of power, the rod and circle very common to such divine depictions. With these symbols, the god is just touching the elbow of his steward, Hammurabi. One of the magnificent things about this scene is the hypnotic assurance with which both god and steward-king intently stare at each other, impassively majestic, the steward king’s right hand held up between the observer and the plane of communication. Here is no humility, no begging before a god, as occurs just a few centuries later. Hammurabi has no subjective-self to narratize into such a relationship. There is only obedience. And what is being dictated are judgements on a series of very specific cases. (page 199)

The First Major Paradigm Shift: Consider how an animistic paradigm would breakdown as the cultural groups became larger and turned primarily to agriculture for subsistence. What-to-do problems would be more frequent and more complex in these cultures. This would especially be the case as ancient hierarchical civilizations emerged. Such civilizations involve vast numbers of people who have no immediate contact with each other. There is a multitude of essential activities, and many of these would not seem to be immediately related to the wellbeing of the individual expected to do them. Animism is too democratic to be a suitable paradigm for such a civilization.

Another factor that could have been involved in the shift from animism to manifest polytheism is that persons in an agricultural civilization, and especially those in its cities, would be further from the wider world of nature. This might make them less inclined to experience the world as filled with spirits. Perhaps this factor could have played a major role in this shift regardless of whether subjective consciousness was widespread or had not yet emerged.

Assuming that Jaynes is correct, in an animistic paradigm, each person hearkens primarily to personal commands from the spirits and this probably played a role in small-group cultures. However having each person hear authoritative voices is not compatible with the centralized control needed in more complex civilizations. A different type of paradigm would be needed. Before language developed proper names, auditory hallucinations could only give impersonal commands. With names, they became associated with particular persons and played a much greater role in individual behavior. According to Jaynes, this led ultimately to hearing them as the voices of the gods. What emerged were manifest polytheistic paradigms, paradigms organized around the commands from the gods of the civilization, with the voices of the household gods subordinated to these voices. Paradigms of this type existed thruout various regions of the world, in Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, China, and Mesoamerica.

Altho Jaynes’ theory meshes with what was just said, so does the gradual development of subjective consciousness. That hearing the gods speak was considered normal in these civilizations seems clear enough. This does not necessarily mean that it was of such central significance in ancient civilizations that subjective consciousness could not also have been involved in deciding what to do in ordinary problematic situations. If Jaynes is wrong, then subjective consciousness must have been even more widely involved than the voices of the gods. Otherwise such civilizations could not have flourished. Under this hypothesis, it still seems likely that the centralized control needed in these civilizations would make animism unsuitable. A manifest polytheism that is mediated by a priesthood could be suitable. Altho subjective consciousness can be socially destabilizing, this paradigm coupled with a centralized political system might provide the stability needed to maintain such civilizations. What is essential is that the people believe that the priests or priest-kings really hears the voices of the gods and that whatever they may determine in their own mind-space is subordinate to that authority.

Remote Polytheism: Altho I encounter the ideas of other gods in the bible at a young age, I do not recall much about them. Instead, most of my information about polytheism came primarily from hearing about the Olympians gods. These gods differed in a major way from the earlier manifest gods of the Iliad. Altho they might concern themselves with the lives of men, most of what was told about these concerns is presented in myths about the past. Zeus consorts with a woman and has Hercules as an offspring. The gods seldom seemed to interact with ordinary persons in the present. In order to ask them about what to do, a person had to go to a special place to consult an oracle or use some type of divination. The abode of the gods was not among mankind but elsewhere. They had lives of their own, away from human concerns. The gods of Manifest Polytheism were at hand. These later Greek gods were remote.

What was said about the Greek gods, also applies to the Norse gods. Given my own monotheistic religious education, these remote aspects of the gods did not seem strange to me. What seemed strange was that they ascribe so many ordinary human characteristics to their gods.

Before reading Jaynes, I had given very little thought to polytheism. I had not asked about its origin, nor had I thought about any contrast between the polytheism I had thought about and any earlier types of polytheism. It was the following account that first suggested this contrast to me. (See page 223)

About 1230 BC, Tukulti-Ninurta I, tyrant of Assyria, had a stone altar made that is dramatically different from anything that preceded it in the history of the world. Tukulti is shown twice, first as he approaches the throne of his god, and then as he kneels before it. The very double image fairly shouts aloud about this beggarly posture unheard of in a king before in history. As our eyes descend from the standing king to the kneeling king just in front of him, it is as emphatic as a moving picture, in itself a quite remarkable artistic discovery. But far more remarkable is the fact that the throne before which this first of the cruel Assyrian conquerors grovels is empty. No king before in history is ever shown kneeling. No scene before in history ever indicates an absent god. The bicameral mind has broken down.

Hammurabi is always carved standing and listening intently to a very present god. And countless cylinder seals from his period show other personages listening eye to eye or being presented to the just-as-real figures of human-shaped gods. The Ashur altar of Tukulti is in shocking contrast to all previous depictions of the relations of gods and men. Nor is it simply some artistic idiosyncrasy. Other altar scenes of Tukulti are similarly devoid of gods. Cylinder seals of Tukulti’s period also show the king approaching other non-present divinities, sometimes represented by a symbol. Such comparisons strongly suggest that the time of the breakdown of the bicameral mind in Mesopotamia is some time between Hammurabi and Tukulti.

The Breakdown of Manifest Polytheism: Most varieties of Manifest Polytheism in the ancient Old World civilizations were replaced by paradigms that were varieties of Remote Polytheism. This did not happen in the Americas, perhaps since such civilizations were conquered by people already having monotheistic paradigms. Using Jaynes’ theory, this shift is easily explained using the reasons below. I take these to be equivalent to the reasons for the breakdown of Manifest Polytheism. After listing these reasons, I only make a few comments. For a more detailed account see Book II Chapter 3.

¨ The weakening of the auditory by the advent of writing

¨ The fragility of hallucinatory control and limitation of the gods in times of upheaval

¨ The positing of internal cause in the observation of difference in others

¨ The acquisition of narratization from epics’

¨ The survival value of deceit

Writing has the advantage of providing a way to give very specific commands that do not depend on hearing them. It also places more control over reception on the reader, who can put the message aside. This potentially weakens hallucinatory control. Furthermore, since the gods are part of the individual, they are not wise beyond the individual. Hallucinatory commands can only work when what-to-do is not too complex to be worked out on an unconscious level and when automaton action produces results that are largely satisfactory. They do not work if obedience to commands leads to an increase in stress. This is bound to happen in times of historical upheaval. In such times, people also observe radical differences between themselves and strangers. This could lead to doubts about their own way of doing things, especially when their own gods are losing. To survive invasions, they must learn to be deceptive. Long-term deceit requires the analog-I that can imagine doing something different from what the person seems to be doing. This ability clearly has survival value during precarious times.

The Shift from Manifest to Remote Polytheism: Explaining the breakdown of Manifest Polytheism does not explain why this paradigm type was replaced by Remote Polytheism. Why did they not go back to Animism? Using Jaynes’ theory, this is also easily explained. He says that some ancient civilizations in the Americas did collapse, but that these collapses probably occurred primarily for internal reasons. People merely returned to living in small hunter-gather groups. In such cases, there may have been a return to Animism. However as the Mayan cities became inhabited again and new ones formed, there was a return to Manifest Polytheism. People living in Old World civilizations encountered a different set of circumstances. Jaynes says that people in these regions were more dependent on various aspect of civilization than were people in the Americas. Furthermore, the collapse of their civilizations involved conflicts that occurred in conjunction with widespread chaos thruout the region. They were faced with beliefs in other gods, and their own gods were no longer capable of helping them with what-to-do problems. Being unreliable, they lost contact with the voices of the gods. What they needed was some way to know what to do when the gods were no longer present.

This is developed in Book II Chapters 3 and 4. I indicate this with a modified excerpt from page 209. This is followed by a brief summary of reasons that might indicate why Remote Polytheism replaced Manifest Polytheism.

The second millenium BC was heavily laden with profound and irreversible changes. Vast geological catastrophes occurred. Civilizations perished. Half the world’s population became refugee. War, previously sporadic, came with hastening and ferocious frequency as this millenium hunched itself sickly into its dark and bloody close. Let us look at two major elements of these upheavals. One was the mass migrations and invasions of peoples all around the eastern Mediterranean due to the volcanic eruption of Thera. The other was the rise of Assyria, in three great phases, warring its way reign by reign westward to Egypt, northward to the Caspian, incorporating all of Mesopotamia, forming a different kind of empire from any that had been known before.

Jaynes goes on to say that with this breakdown, subjective consciousness began to emerge, and because problem solving had been going on in the god part of the bicameral mind, it worked well for many ordinary what-to-do problems. Problems that were more significant were much harder to solve. The need for the gods was still felt. Social practices to meet this need emerged. These included the consultation of oracles and the resort to various types of divination. If the gods are no longer present, we must search for their advice. See pages 236-245 and pages 322-331 for an account of these practices.

Altho Jaynes’ theory explains this shift, it could also be explained without recourse to his theory. Suppose instead that altho subjective consciousness was well developed in these ancient civilizations, its main function was to help in the solutions of ordinary day-to-day problems. In cohesive civilizations, there is often little incentive to radically question the dictates from those in authority, especially about the social order and general moral principles. Consider the attitude of adherents of the Medieval Catholic Paradigm. All that is needed to undermine manifest polytheism is to have a loss of faith in the voices of the gods. That this is likely to happen in the face of social chaos should not be surprising, even if these people were subjectively conscious. In such a time, remote polytheism could be more suitable, since uncertainties could be accounted for by the difficulty in knowing what the gods would have said.

The Shift from Remote Polytheism to Monotheism: For the purposes of this paper, the term monotheism will be used both for pantheistic paradigms and for paradigms with a personal god. The vast majority of persons in the world now adhere to some form of monotheism, altho there is not enough unity among these paradigms to classify them as varieties of some broader paradigm. A significant shift from manifest polytheism to a monotheistic paradigm is indicated in the Bible. Jaynes argues that this was a shift from the bicameral mind to subjective consciousness. Most other shifts to monotheistic paradigms have been from remote polytheistic ones.

It took several centuries for the Catholic Paradigm to replace Remote Polytheism thruout the Roman Empire, but it continued to spread after the empire collapsed. Beginning in the 6^th century Christianity became the major unifying force in Europe. The Anglo-Saxons were largely converted, but the Danes looked on these beliefs with disdain. Yet, it was not long before the gods of the Danes gave way, and the Christian ontology held sway thruout Europe. This shift also took place somewhat earlier in parts of Asia and northern Africa with the advances of Islam. Today it is hard to find anything but traces of polytheism thruout the world. As a cultural force, polytheism has disappeared, altho this happened gradually. In this shift, a major type of ontology was totally displaced by another type of ontology in most of the world. This shift took place during a period for which we have a large amount of reliable historical records. Other shifts of this magnitude, such as a shift from Animism to Manifest Polytheism or from Manifest Polytheism to Remote Polytheism, took place prior to written histories. In fact, if Jaynes is correct, history was not possible prior to the latter shift. He would say that without subjective consciousness and the ability to spatialize time our present concept of history could not have been understood.

Altho Jaynes does not talk about the shift from polytheism to monotheism in terms of comprehensive paradigm shifts, the first few chapters of Book III indicate what he would say. In essence, altho subjective consciousness provides a means of coping with a multitude of what-to-do problems, it leaves some of the most disturbing ones unsolved. With the voices of the gods, doing what is good for social stability is merely automatic obedience. Without the voices, how can people have the kind of moral compass needed for social stability? With only individualistic hedonic and prudential reasons for deliberate action, social stability can be hard to maintain. Consider what he says at the beginning of the chapter entitled The Quest for Authorization.

Our laws are based upon values, which without their divine pendancy would be empty and unenforceable. Our national mottoes and hymns of state are usually divine invocations. (page 307).

The Christian Church returns again and again to the same longing for bicameral absolutes, away from the difficult inner kingdom of agape to an external hierarchy reaching through a cloud of miracle and infallibility to an archaic authorization in an extended heaven. (page 308-309)

Subjective consciousness brings to the fore a multitude of needs, some of which are classified as spiritual by Zeiger and Singer (2008). These do not occur for bicameral individuals, and those that relate somewhat to these modern needs are automatically met in bicameral civilizations. I will only consider moral compass as it relates to the advantage of monotheism over polytheism for social stability. I will focus on one aspect of the final phase of the shift, namely the shift from the Norse Paradigm to the Catholic Paradigm. I find this of particular interest because it involves this kind of comprehensive paradigm shift in its last stages.

I illustrate aspects of this shift by drawing on my favorite historical novel. See Randolph (1990). The main character, Ceridwen has a Christian education grafted on her more pagan early childhood. This conflict between two ontological perspectives can be experienced in her attitudes. It can also be experienced in the relationship between Ceridwen and Sidroc, a reflective Dane who adheres to the Norse Paradigm. Sidroc cannot understand how one can worship a weak god who dies ignobly on the cross. For Sidroc, the gods represent power, and what-to-do is to triumph over ones enemies. While King Alfred appears only near the end of the novel, his presence is felt much earlier. The reader will come to sense that the conflict between Alfred and the Danes is not merely about political or economic power. The Danes may see it primarily this way, but from Alfred’s perspective, it involves an ontology and the place we have in the universe because of it. There is a unity and grandeur in his purposes, which is directly related to his Christian worldview. This inspires a unity in his followers that differ substantially from the unity among the Danes. The Norse gods are not themselves unified. Sidroc can follow whatever leader appears to have the best prospects, and he can switch allegiance without disgrace. In fact, to follow a leader once his prospects seem dim is not a course to be admired.

If the voices of the gods are silent, why did a remote monotheism replace a remote polytheism? The reasons for the success of the Medieval Catholic Paradigm that I can imagine do not depend on whether Jaynes is correct or not. Similar reasons could be given for the success of other monotheistic paradigms. The ontology of the Medieval Catholic Paradigm provided a type of social glue that a polytheistic version couldn’t provide. God speaks with a single voice, and being omniscient, His voice has ultimate authority. Altho the ordinary person cannot hear the voice of God, the Church is God’s voice on earth. This revives the single central authority not available in polytheism (and according to Jaynes lost from bicameral times). The more secular Imperial Roman paradigm was not able to accomplish this, altho its influence in the area of law and political institutions had a major impact on western civilization for many centuries.

Even the adoption of the Medieval Catholic Paradigm was not altogether satisfactory after a high level of subjective consciousness developed. Consider the inquisition and the problems of heresy. When God cannot be heard by all, and there are rival popes, how do we know we can trust the Church? The Protestant answer was that all could hear the word of God, for the Bible was God’s word. Of course, subjectively conscious man seems to hear his word in the Bible with radically different interpretations. After centuries of domination, the Catholic Paradigm was no longer able to provide the social glue to stabilize Western Culture, and no dominant comprehensive paradigm has emerged to provide such stability. Instead, we have had centuries of competing culturally significant comprehensive paradigms, which have been able to dominate only some portions of western civilization.

The Challenge to Religious Paradigms: Altho the Catholic Paradigm lost its dominance in Western Culture, monotheistic versions remained largely unchallenged until a physicalistic ontology began to have influence in the 18^th century. During the 20^th century, religious paradigms have been more seriously challenged by physicalistic ones, and this may be one of the reasons for the secular nature of modern society. However physicalistic paradigms are not currently accepted by most people. Nor have they demonstrated the ability to provide the foundation for the kind of basic values that can hold a culture together.

Culturally Significant Comprehensive Paradigms: A comprehensive paradigm is culturally significant to the extent that its adherents are a community that has a lasting significant influence within the culture. Altho this is an intentionally vague criterion, there are cases that would clearly seem to be included and others that would not. Any instance of the model case is or has been highly significant in some culture. The comprehensive paradigm of a cult that was largely disregarded by almost everyone else would not be culturally significant, altho it could be highly significant to its adherents and their relatives. One sign of the cultural significance of a comprehensive paradigm is when adherents of other comprehensive paradigms are concerned about its influence and view it as a significant competitor or threat to their own. However it is conceptually possible to have a multitude of culturally significant non-competitive comprehensive paradigms, as happened within the Roman Empire. Moreover, a paradigm can be culturally significant even if a vast majority in the culture is almost completely ignorant about it. For example, most people know little about Logical Positivism, in spite of the impact it has had on philosophy of science and the impact that this has had on Western Culture.

The Present Status of Comprehensive Paradigms: In thinking about the status of comprehensive paradigms, let us suppose that the world is becoming sufficiently interrelated to consider most people as members of an emerging worldwide culture, which I will call World Culture. This does not mean that many people are not members of some subcultures with which they more closely identify. In fact, this seems likely to remain the case as long as World Culture is nascent. Nor does it mean that that World Culture will inevitably mature.

None of the religious paradigms has enough adherents in all parts of the world to be as significant in World Culture as they have been in the cultures from which they emerged. No comprehensive paradigm is clearly moving in a direction that most people think will enable it to become dominant in World Culture in the 21^st century. Perhaps this is because something is amiss in all these paradigms. On the other hand, this may be a temporary state of affairs and any signs that not all is well with any them may be misleading. Perhaps a new more ecumenical one could emerge as dominant. Perhaps nothing is significantly amiss with most of the paradigms and the lack of a trend towards a dominant one is due to the individual difference in the kind of paradigms people need.

Before turning to future prospects, recall how the comprehensive paradigm concept relates to values and thus to what-to-do problems. The formulation does not demand that a comprehensive paradigm is the source of values, that it provides the reasons for human activities, or that it is the source of social practices and institutions. Altho it may do any of these, its main role is to establish and support important ethical and conventional values by securing-stabilizing-rationalizing them.

??Spiritual Values: As conceptualized in Descriptive Psychology, a person’s values are the priorities that he/she has the ability to act on. It is easy to see that many of a person’s values can be easily related to that person’s own wellbeing as an organism. A value is spiritual to the extent that it focuses on other concerns. For instance, to value poetry is a spiritual value. It may relate to a person’s bio-wellbeing, but this is not evident. To call a value spiritual is only intended to indicate a role that it seems to play. It involves no ontological commitments. A deeper understanding may show that all values that seem to relate to other concerns are actually related to bio-wellbeing, altho I find this only barely plausible.

Many hedonic values and prudential values are easily seen to relate to bio-wellbeing. Some are so basic that they do not need even have to be acquired. We do not need to learn to positively value comforts and pleasures or the avoidance of pains and discomforts. A single taste of candy may establish a very specific value. Likewise, altho specific prudential values are acquired, the tendency to act with regard to some consequences seems to be inherent. Thus once such values are established, many of them have little need of support from a comprehensive paradigm. It is also easy to relate valuing conventional and ethical behavior to bio-wellbeing. On the other hand, many of a person’s specific conventional and ethical values are not as easy to relate to that person’s bio-wellbeing. Consider the kind of patriotism that includes dying for one’s country. In fact, values directly related to perceived self-interest are so strong that they may overwhelm other values, and one role of a comprehensive paradigm is to add power to values that seem remote from more immediate concerns.

Children acquire and establish many values in an extremely personal manner. An immediate source of many specific values is the people in their environment. The influence of others is especially significant in the acquisition of many spiritual values. The persons that children emulate are the sources for these values. These values can be acquired and established without a comprehensive paradigm. They can also receive considerable support without such a paradigm, such as various types of rewards that result from implementing them. Nevertheless, the added support from a comprehensive paradigm can provide significant security and stability, and can be extremely useful in rationalizing values when they are questioned. Note that many values, especially the ones less directly related to bio-wellbeing, are packaged and transmitted to future generations by a culture’s stories and sayings. These are often directly related to some comprehensive paradigm.

Altho a comprehensive paradigm may assist in the acquisition of values, its main function with respect to values is to support them. Some traditional monotheistic paradigms have performed this function by rooting values in the will of a personal God. This kind of support builds on the personal manner in which values are initially acquired and established. Worship gives a positive foundation, acknowledging God’s exalted status, and the hedonic and the long-term prudential reasons for trying to act in accordance with God’s can seem overwhelming, especially if the ontology involves a belief in an afterlife. Pantheistic paradigms also provide powerful hedonic and prudential reasons for acting in harmony with the universal principles, especially when the ontology involves a belief in reincarnation. A comprehensive paradigm that does not provide powerful hedonic or prudential reasons for acting in accordance with what it takes to be important values may need to find an alternative way of supporting these values. Unless there is a major change in the reasons most people have for their actions, this may not be possible. Altho subjective consciousness may enable us to cope with the vast majority of our what-to-do problems, it may never be sufficient for our deepest ones.

The Future: Descriptive Psychology conceptualizes a person as an individual with a history of deliberate action in a dramaturgical pattern. Without spiritual value, it is hard to make what we do fit into such a pattern. It is hard to imagine an interesting drama in which the protagonist’s concerns are only hedonic or prudential and in which this is not treated as problematic. The need to fit life into a dramaturgical pattern is one reason why many people need strong commitments to secure some of their values. If the need to secure some values is so deep that it can only be supported by a comprehensive paradigm that its adherents want to be dominant, we could be in for an extended period of conflict between them. One result could be the emergence of a single dominant paradigm. On the other hand, there might be a period of cultural chaos, with a resulting breakdown of World Culture. Of course, there are alternative scenarios. It may be that a pluralistic attitude towards comprehensive paradigms could emerge. If so, then comprehensive paradigms may no longer have a significant cultural role to play in the 21^st century. They could still play a significant role for individuals, and paradigms that did not aspire to becoming dominant could comfortably coexist with a variety of other paradigms.

Altho persons acquire criteria for judging what they do thru their participation in social practices and thus tend to look beyond themselves for such criteria, some people look also ultimately within for these criteria and choose not have any external grounding for what they do. They try to embrace an attitude that questions all rules for how to evaluate their actions. Maybe there is no deep human need for a fixed ontology and epistemology, and the influence of comprehensive paradigms may decline without being missed by most people in the 21^st century. Maybe the longing for a dominant paradigm rooted in an external authority will fade. This is the theme of A Free Man’s Worship by Bertrand Russell (1903).

Comprehensive Nets: To be comprehensive, the realm of interest for a net must include everything. Moreover the conceptual distinctions or methods for formulating these distinctions must be sufficient to formulate any propositional claims made by any comprehensive paradigm. Comprehensive nets differ from paradigms in many ways. However, they might have the potential to serve some of the roles comprehensive paradigms once played. They have concepts for thinking about what the world is like, but without debatable ontological commitments. They have concepts for considering epistemologies rather than epistemological beliefs. They include a net for thinking about values and human activity and social practices and institutions. However, they do not have prescriptive implications for personal behavior norms, nor do they provide a means for making value judgments. This does not mean that persons using such a net have no beliefs about such matters, and it certainly does not mean that they have no values. It merely means that these are not part of the net. Since a comprehensive net involves only beliefs rooted in the core of our common vital knowledge as persons, the only thing to be challenged are its utility and its conceptual adequacy.

Note: There is at least one net now used by The Society for Descriptive Psychology that is intended to be comprehensive, altho the name ‘Descriptive Psychology’ might suggest otherwise. Shideler (1990) provides an overview, indicating on page 180 how it is intended to be comprehensive. Her comment is quoted in Singer (2007b). Just search for page 180.

Even a person without a comprehensive paradigm will have been influenced by comprehensive paradigms that are still culturally significant. Such a person may experience discomfort when using only a comprehensive net to reflect on spiritual value, wishing for something beyond this. A net provides ways of thinking and talking about spiritual values, but no support and grounding for them. Perhaps external support and grounding for one’s spiritual values is a basic human need, in which case comprehensive nets will never be an adequate replacement for comprehensive paradigms. On the other hand, the desire for such grounding may be merely a residue effect due to the prevalent influence of traditional paradigms, which were reactions to a past in which subjective consciousness either did not exit or played a role only in ordinary matters. If so, those without a comprehensive paradigm may find that they need only their own inner resources to support and ground their values.

APPENDIX A MY PLAUSIBILITY ATTITUDES TOWARDS JAYNES’ THEORY

Introduction: I am a Mathematics Professor Emeritus, with specialties that include the history of mathematical thought. On first reading The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (henceforth referred to as OCBM), I realized that the theory expounded by Julian Jaynes could help account for the emergence in Greek mathematics of a perspective radically different from any preceding one. It could also help account for the certain features of their epistemology. However my fascination with OCBM is mostly due to my interests in other forms of conceptual study, such as informal logic and conceptual philosophy. These interests have led me to reconsider the plausibility of Jaynes’ theory about the origins of consciousness. Before discussing the evolution of my plausibility attitude, I will make some remarks about what this means.

Altho plausibility could be conceptualized as an attribute of a statement S, as somehow related to the extent to which it is reasonable to believe that S is true, this would not serve the purposes I have in mind. I need a concept that relates to how a personal reaction to a statement is relevant. The Descriptive Psychology concept of an attitude is a type of behavior that relates to some focus of attention. The concept that I am using is that of a plausibility attitude. This concept is developed in Singer (2007). For the purpose of this present paper, just think of a plausibility attitude as a relation between a person and a statement at a particular time. Different plausibility attitudes towards a statement indicate differences in the types of action that might be taken. For example, as my plausibility attitude towards Jaynes’ claim about the origins of consciousness evolved, I joined the Julian Jaynes Society. Before I realized the utility of his subjective consciousness concept I thought of OCBM as very interesting, but I had a widely open plausibility attitude towards his theory about the origins of consciousness. It was my realization that Jaynes had formulated a concept that was both clear and significant that first altered this attitude. Other people used the word consciousness in a way that seemed vague to me. The vague usage of that word prevented me from focusing on what might have been involved in the origins of consciousness.

I do not know how to stress strongly enough that the first two chapters of OCBM present a concept rather than a theory. I wish Jaynes would have focused on this distinction, but since this distinction is often ignored, perhaps he had not thought about it. The essence of this distinction is that theories make claims but concepts do not. Concept may be criticizes in relation to clarity or utility. This is what I would say Jaynes is doing in Chapter 1. He is showing how concepts associated with the word ‘consciousness’ are either vague or are unsuitable for thinking about a significant features of our experience. Of course claims using concepts may be criticized as correct or incorrect. For this to make much sense the concepts used must be clear enough for the purposes at hand. Jaynes says that consciousness is not necessary for reasoning. Using the concept of subjective consciousness and our standard concept of reasoning, I find this claim clear and highly plausible. If this claim were wrong, this would cast doubt on his theory about the origins of subjective consciousness, but it would not indicate that the concept of subjective consciousness was unclear.

Ancient hunter-gather cultures were widespread from at least 30000 BC to 9000 BC. In many places they lasted even later. This is the main reason that I find the claim somewhat plausible that people living in ancient hunter-gather societies lacked subjective consciousness. Subjective consciousness is necessarily innovative, giving rise to new practices that tend to replace traditional ways of doing many things. Perhaps these societies changed more than I have imagined, but otherwise, I find it at most slightly plausible that that subjective consciousness played a major role in their lives. Of course, living in a less complex milieu, traditional ways of doing things might have been so satisfactory that there was little incentive for any basic changes. Perhaps subjective consciousness was used primarily used for very ordinary problems, leaving traditional methods and the acceptance of the vagaries of the world to cope with other matters.

Altho it is not to difficult for me to imagine hunter-gather societies existing with little or no subjective consciousness, Jaynes’ theory about the origins of consciousness claims that it originated much later than 9000 BC, namely some thousands of years after the emergence of ancient agricultural civilizations. It much harder to imagine such civilizations functioning in the way he claims. However if the people were not in some ways radically different from us, it is hard for me to understand why these civilizations also seemed to change so much more slowly than I would have expected. As I reflected more on the extent effective action occurs in recurring types of situations, the claim that human life could be routine enough to act totally without subjective consciousness finally seems fairly plausible. After all most living things act effectively without syntactic language, and so it is conceptually impossible that this involves subjective consciousness.

There is one feature of ancient civilizations has always puzzled me, namely the role of idols. Altho the explanation that they were only symbols of a divinity seemed applicable to versions of Remote Polytheism, it did not mesh with my understanding of the Old Testament concern with idols. Jaynes’ account helped me conceptualize two types of polytheism., and this was another step in the evolution of my plausibility attitude. All versions of Remote Polytheism seemed implausible to me, but they did not seem to involve an alien mentality. The earlier Manifest Polytheism involved a worship of idol in ways that suggest a mentality so radically different from mine that I could almost regard these people as aliens. This does not mean that their mentality was bicameral, but it at least increased my plausibility attitude towards his bicameral mind thesis. Using Jaynes’ theory, the disappearance of Manifest Polytheism as cultural force is easily explained, and this is the explanation that I find most plausible. Jaynes indicates some of the reasons for the breakdown of the bicameral mind. I take these to be equivalent to the reasons for the breakdown of Manifest Polytheism. I do not have enough information to find any account of the emergence of subjective consciousness highly plausible. However, I find Jaynes’ account more plausible than any proposed alternatives.

Key Factors in the Evolution of my Attitude: The factors below were key to my evolving plausibility attitude toward Jaynes’ theory about the origins of consciousness, but all of them together and the preceding discussion of them, cannot account for it. They merely helped me read all of OCBM again with a new perspective, and it was this third reading and my use of his ideas that made the most significant increase in my plausibility attitude. As I mentioned earlier, initially I had a wide-open plausibility attitude of towards his theory about the origins of consciousness, finding it at worst barely plausible and at best highly plausible. Currently my attitude is still rather open. I now find it at worst somewhat plausible and at best highly plausible. The key factors in my attitude are indicated below.

¨ Having a clear concept of subjective consciousness

¨ Noting how much can be done without subjective consciousness

¨ Realizing the necessity of syntactic language for subjective consciousness

¨ Contrasting the rate of change in ancient and prehistoric culture to later rates of change

¨ The strong sense that mentality of manifest polytheism is almost alien

Barriers to Finding OCBM Plausible: So far I have commented only on the evolution of my own plausibility attitudes. I am also interested in the plausibility attitudes of others, and specifically on the barriers to finding Jaynes’ theory at least somewhat plausible. I can think of at least two major types of barriers. First it can be difficult to understand the concepts he is using and to use them correctly to focus on what his theory actually claims. It can also be difficult to look at the support he presents with an open attitude.

As happened in my case, I think that the ordinarily vague use of the word consciousness is one of the first major barriers that most people would encounter. Anyone not using Jaynes’ consciousness concept will not even understand what he is proposing. Unfortunately OCBM does not formulate the concept prior to discussing what consciousness is not, and this discussion is presented in a way that suggests that we at least implicitly understand the concept. It is for this reason that I refer to the concept as subjective consciousness (which Jaynes also occasionally uses) and before introducing Jaynes’ ideas I would begin with a discussion of this concept.

Another barrier is the inability to imagine acting without something so ubiquitous in our own experience. Closely related is the inability to feel that other people may be able to function using a mentality that seems totally alien to us. Reservations of this type are probably more emotional than rational. I suggest putting these barriers in perspective by using the imagination. However I found them so strong that I had to do this repeatedly before they are became reservations rather than barriers. One strategy I used was to examine my dreams to see to what extent I could think in terms of deliberate action while dreaming. Except for the occasions when I could spot that I was dreaming, I found myself dreaming of a vast amount of activity that was totally devoid of deliberate action.

Closely related to the barrier involving the difficulties of imagining the lack of subjective consciousness is the tendency to read OCBM with the expectation that the case he presents must be conclusive. Since his presentation includes interpretations of a wide variety of types of information, it would be surprising if none of his presentation could be reasonably challenged. To find his theory even somewhat plausible, one must realizes that his theory does not rest on any specific interpretations that he makes. For example, suppose further study of the human brain did not fit his account of its functioning. This might decrease my plausibility attitude somewhat, but it would not be crucial. The bicameral mind hypothesis is about a way of thinking rather than about how the brain works. An understanding of its physiological basis for this way of thinking could be useful, but lack of such understanding does not mean that it could not exist. Likewise a misinterpretation of one passage in the Iliad does not mean that Achilles did not have a bicameral mentality.

Evidential Plausibility: Suppose that everyone found Jaynes’ theory about the origins of consciousness highly plausible. This would not mean that the theory is correct. It would not even mean that the evidence warranted these attitudes. Nor would the opposite plausibility attitudes mean that the evidence warranted them. A plausibility attitude is evidential to the extent that the major factor contributing to it is an adequate consideration of the available evidence, see Singer (2007). My account of plausibility attitudes has so far ignored consideration of the extent to which they are evidential. I have tried to adopt a plausibility towards OCBM that is evidential, and this is one of the reasons that the this attitude is still fairly open. I think that this is what is currently warranted and I wish more people had open plausibility attitudes towards Jaynes’ theory about the origins of consciousness. Plausibility attitudes can be based on many factors other than evidence, and these attitudes can influence both the search for evidence and its interpretation. Narrow attitudes on both sides lead to conflict rather than cooperation. More open attitudes could lead to a less biased search for evidence, and this is what I would like to see happen. Understanding the origins of subjective consciousness could be one of the most significant factors in understanding our past. I would hate to see explorations about this ignored or distorted by narrow plausibility attitudes. It will be a difficult search even with more open ones.

References: Formulations of many of the concepts from Descriptive Psychology can be found in the Concept Dictionary-Encyclopedia on the Descriptive Psychology section of conceptualstudy.org. For a comprehensive introduction to these concepts, see Persons, Behavior, and the World, by Mary Shideler. For a deeper perspective, see various books from the collected works of Peter Ossorio. The Behavior of Person covers all the material in Shideler, but with nuances, she does not consider. More about Descriptive Psychology and its applications are developed in the series Advances in Descriptive Psychology. These books can be ordered from the Society for Descriptive Psychology website sdp.org.

Bova, Ben (2003) Saturn. New York: Tor

Jaynes, Julian (1990) The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind Boston: Houhgton Mifflin. Anyone who finds this book of interest might also be interested in the website (www.julianjaynes.org) of the Julian Jaynes Society.

Kuhn, Thomas (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

McCullough, Colleen (1990) The First Man in Rome. New York: Avon Books

Ossorio, Peter (2006) The Behavior of Persons. Ann Arbor MI: Descriptive Psychology Press

Ossorio, Peter (1998) Place. Ann Arbor MI: Descriptive Psychology Press

Shideler, Mary (1988) Persons, behavior, and the world. New York: University Press of America

Internet References

Pajares, Frank Outline and Study Guide for Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/Kuhn

Randolph, Octavia (1996) The Circle of Ceridwen, octavia.net. This novel is available free on her website.

Russell, Bertrand (1903) A Free Man’s Worship. http://www.users.drew.edu/%7Ejlenz/fmw.html

Singer F. Richard III and Zeiger, H Paul (2008) Comprehensive Paradigms, conceptualstudy.org Conceptual Papers Section

Singer F. Richard III (2008) A Personal Approach to Conceptual Philosophy conceptualstudy.org Conceptual Philosophy Section

Singer F. Richard III (2007) Plausibility Concepts, conceptualstudy.org Conceptual Papers Section

Singer F. Richard III (2007b) The Potential Impact of Descriptive Psychology, conceptualstudy.org in the Descriptive Psychology Section.