THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY
by F Richard Singer III edition date 11/07/07
website:
www.conceptualstudy.org
email: richardsinger3@sbcglobal.net
Overview: This paper begins with a perspective on Descriptive Psychology and its potential impact. In order to consider some of the barriers to the actualization of this impact, this is followed by a brief discussion of conceptual philosophy. Some epistemic concepts are sketched. Various types of study are then conceptualized, primarily by indicating conditions on parameters for describing the behavior involved in these types of study. Conceptual study is characterized by conditions on the want and performance parameters. Conceptual study is classified as pre-empirical or as purely conceptual, depending on conditions placed on the significance parameter. Other conditions on these parameters are used to characterize scientific study. Descriptive Psychology is revisited using these concepts. Other than our conceptual net for contemporary mathematics, Descriptive Psychology is seen to be the only major conceptual net that has been developed using mature conceptual study. In this light, some barriers to a wider recognition of conceptual study and Descriptive Psychology are considered. Finally, some tentative suggestions for undermining the barriers to the recognition of Descriptive Psychology are sketched.
Notation: The letter P is a variable ranging over the domain of persons.
Descriptive Psychology: A conceptual net is a network of conceptual distinctions and conceptual relationships that is used to think about some realm of interest; perhaps to obtain or organize information about it, to propose conjectures about it, to suggest questions about it, etc. The concept of a realm of interest is broad. It includes anything that any person might be interested in thinking about or doing something about. A casual tennis match could be a realm of interest for a few people, altho probably not a lasting one. Some realms have been studied extensively enough that we have named them as areas of study. For example, biology is an area of study. An area of study focuses on a realm that may be called a world. A realm is a world if it is both extensive and largely self-contained.
The term ‘conceptual net’ will usually be abbreviated by the word ‘net’. Descriptive Psychology is such a net. It is a public net, i.e. it is used in similar ways by a noteworthy number of people and is designed for use by a wider public. PNDP denotes this net (Public Net for Descriptive Psychology). In spite of its name, its realm of interest is unbounded, going far beyond considerations usually associated with the word ‘psychology’. That the realm of interest for PNDP is unbounded can be briefly indicated by something on page 180 of Persons, Behavior and The World by Mary Shideler. This can be taken as the scope of PNDP, at least potentially.
As a pre-empirical conceptual system, Descriptive Psychology provides us with the resources to bring together science and art, religion and the behavioral sciences, history and law, fairy tales and everyday living. It does so in a way that preserves the uniqueness of every domain and individual yet does not leave them isolated from one another. Because it is reflexive and recursive, it is unlimited in its scope and precision. Because it is content-free, it is not culture-bound in the usual sense, and is non-committal with respect to anything empirical: to repeat, it does not "preempt the answers to any questions that could be settled empirically". It is a resource designed to increase our behavior potential, not a way to limit it by imposing a set of theories or a sequence of behaviors, like answers at the back of the book.
This perspective is so radical that it is hard to appreciate or even realize what has been accomplished. It is hard for them to understand that PNDP does not constitute a psychological theory or a theory of any type. As indicated, it is net, and thus theory neutral. In this it resembles another theory neutral conceptual net, namely PNCM (Public Net for Contemporary Mathematics). Most other extensive nets are entangled with a multitude of non-conceptual considerations. The potential scope of PNDP is much wider than that of PNCM. However, PNDP has not evolved over many centuries from the work of a large number of people. Hopefully this will be its future.
The Potential Scientific Impact of PNDP: Altho this may seem like an extravagant conjecture, Ossorio could be to behavioral science what Galileo was to physics. This means that PNDP could provide a neutral net for any empirical theory and research in the behavioral sciences much as mathematics does for physical sciences. If so, PNDP (or some similar net) has the potential to provide a paradigm shift in behavioral sciences that could revolutionize them to the same extent that mathematics has revolutionized the physical sciences.
There are significant differences in the role of Galileo and the potential role of Ossorio. Galileo had the insight that kinematics could be studied using the tools of a well-established mathematics net. The difference between physics before and after Galileo depends on that net. Modern physics could not even be formulated without the net provided by mathematics. What Galileo had to counter was a scholastic paradigm that rooted knowledge about the physical world in divine revelation and the writings of Aristotle. Ossorio faced both the positivist attitudes towards knowledge that are still present in the community of behavioral scientists and the task of creating the net to be used. This community was not prepared to appreciate the utility of a net centered on the concept of a person. Nor were they prepared to broaden their paradigm in a way that would use such a net.
To appreciate what Ossorio has done, one must be aware of what is involved in deliberately shaping an extensive conceptual net. Even in pure mathematics, which now focuses on shaping PNCM, it was only during the 20th century that this conceptual appreciation finally emerged. Since an understanding of the perspective underlying PNCM is not widespread outside of the community of mathematicians, the utility of a focusing on a conceptual net is not widely appreciated. Paul Halmos gives an excellent account of this in a paper in the American Scientist 56, 4, 1968 entitled Mathematics as a Creative Art. Even physical scientists are inclined to ignore mathematical results that do not advance their immediate concerns. An elaboration on the lack of appreciation of the value of focusing a major effort on conceptual matters will be given later, when some of the barriers to a wider recognition of conceptual study and Descriptive Psychology are examined.
The Potential Ordinary Impact of PNDP: Even if PNDP has the potential to revolutionize the behavioral sciences, this may not be its greatest potential. Scientific knowledge is specialized. Much of it is important to a person only when that person can relate it to ordinary knowledge. The main impact for PNDP could be on the nets we use for our ordinary interests and the net we use for realms that are of wide public interest. The use of mathematics is much broader than its use in the sciences, and most people have enough interest in some numerical matters to learn basic arithmetic. People may not be as competent as they would like in managing their personal finances, but interest in this realm is widespread. PNDP could be used even more widely than arithmetic. It could be used by anyone to think about anything people do. The use of this net as the core of a person’s net for everyday living could be extremely empowering, and hopefully concepts from PNDP will someday become a part of everyone’s general education.
When discussing a draft of this paper with Paul Zeiger, he suggested that including more about the role for PNDP in ordinary matters. Reflecting on this, what stands out is an extremely clear set of conceptual distinctions. These can be used to think about a variety of ordinary matters, not the least of which involves enhancing ones person characteristics and personal relationships and community participation. Even more important, PNDP is a dynamic way of thinking. It includes conceptual clarification methods, such as paradigm case analysis, that allows a person clarify any additional concepts they might want to consider. This could be especially useful in understanding differences in opinion. People using the same words for different concepts obscure these differences. This makes it almost impossible to determine what is actually at stake.
Because of my deep interest in philosophy and mathematical logic, the impact that the way of thinking in PNDP has had in my life is atypical. For more perspective on the role that this way of thinking might have in ordinary matters, I focus on how it has affected my wife Charmayne. She and I talk about concepts and related ideas as we walk together for exercise. Often we read before we walk. We have read and discussed Persons Behavior and the World and many of the papers in Advances in Descriptive Psychology. This is something she would not have done without me, her history of deliberate action being centered on the cultivation and the application of her faith. When I questioned her about the value of the conceptual aspects of our talks, her main response centered on the fact that they have expanded her awareness in ways that would not otherwise happened. In discussing this, one of the things she said was that most people do not even think about having concepts. They think of words instead. She agreed that the essence of what she meant was that they act as if words were concepts, almost as if words have fixed meanings and that these meaning should be clear to anyone who understood the language. I suggested that when a misunderstanding is recognized people often think of this as a semantic rather than conceptual problem. They feel that what is needed is a clarification of what the words truly mean, disregarding the underlying conceptual nets that supports the meaning of the language being used. Focusing on the flexible use of language to make conceptual distinctions does not seem to be a very common social practice.
I asked her to give a specific example of how our conceptual discussions had made a difference for her. She said that this was not easy to pin down, since the difference was in her general perspective. Since she was teaching an adult Sunday school class, where the topic was on purposes, we decided to focus on this. One thing that emerged for her was a broader perspective on the relationship and distinctions between various kinds of purposes. However, she made no actual use of this in the class. A few days later, I wanted to discuss what I was writing on about ethical concepts and ethical systems. She said that she always thought of just being ethical, rather than of being ethical in terms of some ethical system. Altho she clearly knew that people had strong ethical differences, she had not thought of this in terms of using different ethical systems. As an analogy, we talked about different act being legal in different legal systems. Again, what emerged was an expanded perspective. She did not think of any specific difference this would make for her. I think this is one reason that the value of pure conceptual thinking for ordinary matters may seem hard to articulate. It just allows a person to focus on more relationships and make more distinction. As such, it is a tool providing for more options, thus allowing for an increase in behavior potential. It does so in ways that are often more implicit than explicit. Pure conceptual study is a tool for designing and shaping conceptual tools. The vast majority of our ordinary conceptual tools emerged in the process of doing. They just grew like Topsy. Having tools, we are more likely to use them than to focus on when and why we are using them or on their power. It is when a tool fails that we focus on the tool rather than on what we are doing with it. Even then, the value of pure conceptual study may not be apparent. Why bother to modify a tool more than is needed for the application you have in mind? Toolmakers love tools primarily for aesthetic reasons. Mostly, others do not.
Conceptual & Paraceptual: That a navy captain outranks a marine captain is information about the relationship between concepts used in our public net for military ranks. Such information is conceptual, since it is independent of any state of affairs in that realm. That a specific person is a marine captain uses this net to give information about a state of affairs that this net is intended to help us understand. Such information is paraceptual in relation to this net. The concept of paraceptual information includes information that is called empirical, but the term empirical often used in a narrower manner that relates to verification. Specifically empirical information is paraceptual information that has been explicitly checked and reasonably verified by observation or study of some non-conceptual realm.
¨ Conceptual information is about concepts and relationships between concepts in some net, and which is known by working within the net.
¨ Paraceptual information presupposes some net, but is about some particular state of affairs that the net is intended to help access.
Paraceptual Information: Information about concepts can be paraceptual. Consider the statement that a person is an individual with a history of deliberate action. It can be used as a paraceptual proposition to inform someone about how the person concept is used in PNDP. However, using it as a prelude to making a judgement about some behavior description, it would be a conceptual proposition. The difference is that in one case we are providing information about the net to someone who is not thinking from within the net. In the other case, we would be speaking from within that net to anyone who is also using that net.
Net Concepts: Altho we could think of a concept as a type of object, concepts are more like interwoven strands of a net. This is why the word net was chosen for a collection of related concepts and conceptual distinctions instead of a word like system or scheme or structure. It is suggestive of the flexible nature of concepts and their relationships. Concepts do not exist as independent entities. They support each other and some net, which also supports them. A concept can only be understood in relation to its place within some net. As indicted by a PNDP maxim, concepts are acquired by using them, and it is important to stress that this involves using them in the context of other concepts.
A concept is essential in a net if the net and its realm of interest could not be understood without it. For instance, the concept of a parent is essential to our ordinary net for family relationships, for without it the relationship between a mother and a father could not be understood. P’s routine net contains all the concepts that P routinely uses in everyday activities or in the pursuit of interests that P would not classify as highly specialized, altho some concepts from P’s routine net will be in even the most specialized net P uses. The core of P’s routine net is an implicit part of all of the nets P uses for particular realms of interest. The public routine net for a community is conceptualized in a similar manner. It is what is largely common to most members’ routine nets.
A concept is crucial for P if P’s routine net would be incoherent without it. P’s fundamental net is the subnet of P’s routine net that includes P’s crucial concepts and the concepts they most directly support. The concepts in P’s fundamental net are the intimately intertwined strands that mediate all of P’s experience and permeate P’s thinking. Its concepts will be essential (altho perhaps only implicitly) for all of P’s nets, but most such nets will also have other essential concepts. The crucial concepts for a community and a communities fundamental net are conceptualized in a similar manner.
Some version of the concept of a person is crucial for any
person, for it would be impossible to be a person in a world of persons without
such a concept. If a person P had no idea of what it meant to do something then
P would be incapable of deliberate action. Thus some
version of the concept of doing is crucial for any person. A
closely related crucial concept is the concept of understanding, and
intertwined with this are the crucial concepts of a concept and of a conceptual
distinction. This does not mean that these concept
cannot be modified. Nor does it mean that they must be explicitly in focus. It
only means that without some implicit version of them it would be impossible
for P to make sense of anything.
Conceptual Philosophy: The term ‘conceptual philosophy’ refers an area of
study and a type of study. It also refers to a net that can result from such a
study. Conceptual philosophy is the area of study that focuses on fundamental
nets. Doing conceptual philosophy involves a type of study during which the
want parameter is to enhance a conceptual understanding of crucial concepts. A conceptual philosophy is a coherently
organized fundamental net. More accurately a
fundamental net is a conceptual philosophy to the extent that it is coherently
organized, whether or not it results from doing conceptual philosophy.
Unlike most philosophical activity, in doing conceptual philosophy we focus primarily on concepts. We do not propose philosophical theories, except perhaps to clarify how concepts could be used. Instead of asking about the nature of reality, we study the crucial concepts we use for thinking about what happens in the world. The reality concepts from PNDP are easily integrated into a conceptual philosophy. In fact, we could consider conceptual philosophy as a branch of Descriptive Psychology, altho a largely undeveloped one. Before explicating this, some concept from the epistemic subnet of one version of conceptual philosophy will be sketched.
A Realm of Certainty: The concept of a realm of certainty is central to understanding the epistemic significance of PNDP and conceptual philosophy. There is a great deal that each of us takes for granted. A typical person P takes it for granted that he has never been on Mars, that the car being driven is not a mirage, that physical objects continue to exist when no one is observing them, that he can normally count in a reliable manner, etc. The total collection of such beliefs, whether explicit or implicit, or whether correct or incorrect, is P’s realm of certainty. Elements in a person’s realm of certainty may be manifest and trivial. They may be remote and ubiquitous in scope. They may be anything between. The concept of a realm of certainty for a person can be extended in an obvious way to a public realm of certainty for any community. It is what is common to most members’ realm of certainty.
Certainty is an attitude towards a belief. Attitudes can change. A child does not begin with the realm of certainty that he or she will have as an adult. A person’s realm of certainty for P evolves, altho for a normal adult in a stable environment it changes very little. Altho the realm of certainty for a community can also change, for a viable cohesive community the it will be extremely stable and will be included in the realms of certainty for members of the community.
Basic Reliable Knowledge: Knowledge in P’s realm of certainty is basic reliable knowledge to the extent that it is reasonable to take it for granted. This knowledge is a basis that P relies on without question, and which P’s experience has successfully supported a multitude of times, altho this is normally more implicit than explicit. That items mentioned earlier are not only in P’s realm of certainty, they are also part of P’s basic reliable knowledge. The terminology is a reminder of the role such knowledge plays. Basic reliable knowledge is acquired by living. It emerges from the experience accumulated by operating within the world. It is grounded pragmatically by the experience that it can reasonably be relied upon.
The Realm for PNDP: The realm of interest for PNDP is potentially everything involving persons, including what they think about and what they do. Much of our knowledge about this realm is basic reliable knowledge. Ossorio developed a version of the concepts that our routine net uses for this realm. To do this, he went beyond the concepts in our routine net to formulate a net that contains a sophisticated and refined routine along with a net for thinking about our routine net as well as the ordinary foundations of any net. It is this feature that makes PNDP reflexive and recursive. Because our routine net accesses basic reliable knowledge, and because such knowledge is a basis for a person’s behavior in the world, PNDP could be characterized as the branch of conceptual study whose area is that of persons behaving in the world. This entails having person concepts and reality concepts that are clearly formulated and enable descriptions without paraceptual commitments, other than basic reliable ones. To the extent one thinks of psychology as the study of persons, this gives a reason for the name Descriptive Psychology. However using the word ‘psychology’ should not obscure the fact that its concepts can to a large extent be understood on the basis of what the ordinary connotations of the terms for these concepts suggest.
Study: Study-related concepts provide an additional perspective on the potential impact of PNDP. Study is a type of activity during which P wants to enhance an understanding of some state of affairs, and that state usually has some place in some realm of interest. Due to the way the want parameter is conceptualized, this implies that P’s performance is guided by that want. What counts is the want parameter and its relationship to the performance parameter. In particular, the achievement parameter is not relevant. In fact, much of a person’s understanding is achieved without study. Study is directed to the acquisition of understanding that does not just accrue by living.
Most of the time when we talk about study we are thinking of a study episode rather than a single action. To say that P studied history last night would normally suggest that P did more than look up a historical fact in the encyclopedia. However, the concept of study used here includes extremely casual activity. Even watching a game of chess and asking how a pawn is allowed to move qualifies as study, altho perhaps as fleeting study. A study episode for P is a sequence of events with P as actor whose elements are related by the common theme of understanding some realm. This means that not only is the want parameter for much of P’s noteworthy action a desire to understand, but the significance parameter for much of the other thematic action also relates to understanding. P takes a few deep breaths because P wants to relieve tension. This act is not study, but the significance parameter involves the study theme if P is doing this to help focus on where the mistake might have occurred in the last calculation.
Two Main Types of Study: Since study is something that P can do, basic reliable knowledge can emerge from study. This is seldom the want parameter for study, nor is it usually a major part of the significance parameter. In fact, most study does not effect P’s basic reliable knowledge. Instead, study is designed to acquire or enhance a different type of understanding, namely understanding outside of the realm of certainty. Altho basic reliable knowledge is not usually the goal of study, study may be directed towards a refinement of such knowledge. Study can be classified as conceptual or paraceptual.
CS (Conceptual Study) is conceptualized in relation to the concept of a net. In doing CS, what is being studied is in some realm that is a net and the study is done primarily from within that net. The want parameter is guided by a desire to understand some portion of the net, and often to modify the net. CS also involves a special condition on the performance parameter, namely that the only conceptual claims are being made from within the net being studied. Other types of study involve paraceptual claims, i.e. claims that apply some portion of a net to realm other than the net. Of course, CS presupposes some paraceptual knowledge, but to qualify as CS this must only be basic reliable knowledge. Without some such knowledge, a person would not even know that he or she was studying. CS may also use the concepts being studied to makes paraceptual claims or conjectures, as long as it is understood that this is done merely to add a conceptual perspective on these concepts.
Many study episodes are a mixture of paraceptual study and conceptual study, with the emphasis being on the paraceptual components. Contemporary mathematics is the main exception in the academic world, with most of the study being conceptual. Except for ordinary claim of competence, PNCM rests on conceptual prerequisites rather than on presuppositions. Like any net, it uses routine net concepts. It was the evolution of PNCM that should make mathematicians easily appreciate the potential impact of PNDP, except that many of them lack the interest.
Areas of Study: Common names for broad areas of study include physics, chemistry, biology, history, economics, mathematics, etc. More specialized areas may have there own names, such as botany. Names of areas may also directly indicate their relation to a more general area, such as molecular biology, altho the name Descriptive Psychology does not indicate a specialized area within what is usually called psychology. For most areas of study, such as the ones just mentioned, the type of study used can be conceptual or paraceptual or mixed. For most of them, paraceptual study is still predominant, with conceptual study episodes occasionally mixed in. The exception would be any area in which the realm of interest was a net. For such a realm, the study would be mostly conceptual.
Evolution of Conceptual Study for a Realm: The division into the following stages from C0 to C3 is a rough attempt to give some linear order to developments in doing CS in relation to a realm R.
C0: CS episodes are brief and not recognized as such. There is little or no attempt to focus directly on concepts apart from paraceptual applications.
C1: Concepts are examined in their own right, with an attempt to clarify concepts by definition. Conceptual considerations are subordinated to paraceptual ones, with concepts recognized as legitimate only if they represent something considered as existing in R. Basic law or axioms may be formulated for R, but are regarded as true of R, rather than as a means of concept clarification.
C2: There is an attempt to formulate all concepts for R, using definitions or other conceptual methods. Altho paraceptual restrictions are not placed on the concepts in the net, the net is judged by paraceptual considerations outside the net. This is done using various abstract concepts that are intertwined with certain paraceptual beliefs.
C3: At this level, there are extended episodes of CS. Nets are formulated with or without regard to any particular realm of application. Deliberate efforts are made to not favor paraceptual beliefs about any intended realm of application, except perhaps a belief that the net might be useful for thinking about this realm. This level will be referred to as mature CS.
Even in mathematics, CS has not always been mature.
Pre-Greeks; mathematics was at stage C0. The Greek perspective considered
geometry as the study of an ideal space that was more fundamental than physical
space. It was mixed study, with CS as a major secondary unrecognized component
at about level C1. The realm was imagined as platonistic rather than personal
or natural. An understanding of this provides a perspective on what they were
attempting, but does not mean that their platonistic realm of ideal space is
essential. Hilbert’s work in euclidean geometry was mature CS. He even describes
it as such. He used definitions and axioms without any commitments to this
being a theory of either an ideal or a physical space. Mathematical study from
then on is mature CS. In the late 19th century, we were mostly at level C2.
This estimate is based on some of the prevalent attitudes.
Comprehensive Paradigms: The evolution of CS in mathematics and its expanded use into the more extensive realm of interest for PNDP may be an important step towards a potential comprehensive paradigm shift. It is the epistemic and ontic components of PNDP, along with the person related concepts that are central to the new type of net that may emerge. This paradigm shift in mathematics and that suggested by the creation of PNDP could be a prelude to one of the most significant comprehensive paradigm shifts in human history. This could be a shift away from the traditional types of comprehensive paradigms towards a comprehensive net. To explain this, the concept of a comprehensive paradigm will be sketched.
Altho the routine net for a community C contains all of the concepts C needs for thinking about basic reliable knowledge, it may not contain concepts used to think about all of the beliefs in C’s realm of certainty. C will usually have a broader net that is used in relation to cosmic concerns. The beliefs and concepts are likely to be so intertwined that they will normally be used unreflectively. Separating them will not even be considered. This conglomerate, along with some other kinds of commitments, is a comprehensive paradigm for C. The realm of interest for such a paradigm potentially includes everything. This means that altho it will not explicitly focus attention on all matters, it influences everything that those in C do and think about, and there is no act or thought that cannot be judged by the paradigm. Its concerns are broader than those in a limited paradigm, as are its prescriptive attitudes towards behavior. See Comprehensive Paradigms from conceptualstudy.org for more details and examples.
Paradigm Case of a Comprehensive Paradigm: In the paradigm given case below, C is a culture.
(1) The paradigm has sufficient influence to dominate some culture for generations, primarily by being internalized by almost everyone in the culture. It thus provides internal cohesiveness and unity and stability and a sense of security and wellbeing.
(2) The paradigm will be strongly defended if seriously challenged from without, and any adherent who seriously challenges its core components will be severely sanctioned.
(3) The paradigm has a set of primary core beliefs about how things are, and these are considered essential. One of its core components is a preeminent cosmic version, including beliefs about the origin of the universe, the nature of reality, what can and what must exist, humanities place in the universe. Another of its core components is a set of epistemological beliefs that govern acceptable practices for obtaining and verifying what is known and what can be known.
(4) An essential component of its core provides a foundation for the values. This component includes ways for thinking about human activity and criteria for making value judgments about such activity. This has strong prescriptive implications for personal behavior norms, especially those involving principles for behavior. This component is the one that is most essential to cultural stability. Many social practices and institutions are organized around it, and it provides a rationale and support for them, including means for making judgements about any social practice or institution.
Allowable Transformations: Change culture in (1) to a subculture or community or even a single person, and even allow different communities to have versions of the same paradigm. Weaken (1) by omitting cohesiveness or unity or stability, or allow its influence to last for a shorter time. Weaken (2) by changing strongly defended to something like defended, or by changing seriously sanctioned to something like ignored or ridiculed. Even omit (2). Change beliefs in (3) to considerations, and omit preeminent in respect to a cosmic version or perhaps change version to a cosmic image or to cosmic images. Change epistemological beliefs to epistemic considerations. Omit (4) or weaken it in any way.
Comprehensive nets: This is a limiting case of a comprehensive paradigm, obtained by using most of the allowable transformations. It provides a conceptual net and some attitudes for thinking about any realm. This does not mean that its net contains all the concepts needed to think about everything. It merely means anything considered could involve and be mediated by concepts from its net. Furthermore, it does not contain any essential beliefs about any realm, altho as with any human creation it presupposes some basic reliable knowledge. Currently there is no comprehensive net that is used by any community, altho with some augmentations, PNDP net would be comprehensive.
Traditional comprehensive paradigms emerged in slowly changing cultures, where they functioned as a support for fixed values and as a rationale for rigid social practices and institutions. This may not be a useful function in a more rapidly evolving pluralistic world culture. Values can be acquired and maintained without the support of a comprehensive paradigm. Perhaps all the values needed for social stability would better evolve if they were seen to be independent on any particular paradigm. If so traditional types of comprehensive paradigms are not as important in supporting such values as it might seem from examining the role they have previously played. A useful comprehensive paradigm may differ radically from the paradigm case. It would emphasize tolerance, a value that does not depend on any particular paradigm and could be a sufficient stabilizing value if widely adopted. Not being committed to paraceptual beliefs, other than vital knowledge, a comprehensive net could play a central role in a stable pluralistic world culture.
Pure Conceptual
Study & Pre-Paraceptual Study: Conceptual
study is pure if the significance parameter relates in a noteworthy manner
mainly to conceptual concerns. It is pre-paraceptual if a noteworthy part of
the significance parameter involves becoming better prepared to apply the
concepts being studied to paraceptual concerns. Since significance can be
complex, an episode of conceptual study can be both pure and pre-paraceptual.
The study of the metric system in American elementary schools is seldom
pre-paraceptual, altho similar study would be in many countries. Altho
pre-paraceptual and pure conceptual study differ in the significance parameter,
when successful their achievement parameters share a very important feature.
Their achievements involve shaping conceptual tools that are theory neutral.
Science: The term science refers to a type of activity and to the organized body of results from such activity. For the purpose of this paper, science is conceptualized as a type of study, namely sustained systematic study of some aspect of some world. The concept of systematic being used implies that science seeks to organize a general understanding, rather than rely on a case-by-case understanding. This constitutes a special condition on the want parameter. Being systematic also involves using highly organized conceptual distinctions and conceptual relationships, as well as some set of practices. This constitutes a condition on the performance parameter.
Altho the concept of science used should be clear enough to make the classifications that are relevant to this paper, it is intentionally imprecise. The concept of sustained is vague. It is not used as if study was either sustained or not sustained. What is meant is that the study is sustained enough to be considered noteworthy. A similar comment applies to the concept of being systematic. For instance, a study of the world of duplicate bridge could be challenging enough to involve sustained systematic study, and thus could be science. To qualify as pre-empirical science, it would focus only on the concepts and conceptual relationships involved, such as bidding concepts, concepts involving master points, etc. This would also need to be done with the further goal of enabling some scientific study in relation to that world.
Pre-Empirical Study: Pre-paraceptual study is pre-empirical to the extent that a noteworthy part of the significance parameter involves becoming better prepared to apply concepts to empirical concerns, i.e. concerns about information that is intended to be validated by observation. The study of football concepts by a defensive coordinator could be as pre-empirical if he intends to use this to help formulate strategic and tactical principles and to check these by systematic observation.
Since other aspects of doing are more significant than verifying information, much of our pre-paraceptual study is not pre-empirical. A person usually learns the rules for backgammon by pre-paraceptual rather than pre-empirical study. The rules are too simple to be challenging and are normally mastered rather casually. Nor is an intention to verify an understanding of these rules a noteworthy part of the significance parameter that we would use to describe someone studying these rules.
Altho there are clear-cut cases of pre-empirical study, there is no sharp boundary between pre-paraceptual studies that are or are not pre-empirical. Learning the concepts in our ordinary net for family relationships could be a form of pre-paraceptual study that is not pre-empirical, altho it could be pre-empirical if a noteworthy part of the significance parameter was to observe family interactions and validate paraceptual information about these relationships.
Pre-Empirical Science: A study of concepts to be used in any recognized area of empirical science would normally be classified not only as pre-empirical study but also as pre-empirical science. In general pre-empirical study is pre-empirical science if a noteworthy part of the significance parameter involves becoming better prepared to apply concepts to empirical science. Pre-empirical science is mature CS that is pre-empirical in two ways. Its significance parameter is a prelude to empirical concerns and these concerns involve preparation for empirical science.
The conceptual part of Men and Women: Partners and Lovers by Mary Kathleen Roberts (Advances in Descriptive Psychology Volume 2) is an excellent example of pre-empirical science. This paper is systematic and well organized. It uses concepts from PNDP to develop other specialized concepts. The conceptual part is a prelude to the empirical part and is clearly separated from the empirical concerns. Similar remarks could be made about other papers from Advances, many of which have conceptual parts that are pre-empirical science. In fact, Descriptive Psychology goes beyond what most people think of as psychology. Rather than being area of study within psychology, a major portion of Descriptive Psychology is the only pre-empirical science for all areas of behavioral science.
Mature Conceptual Science: Mathematics is the most widely known net involving mature conceptual study, altho that this is what mathematicians do is not widely known. Most of this study is not pre-paraceptual, since even when it provides concepts for paraceptual applications; this is not part of the significance parameter for this type of study. Work in mathematics may be suggested by any human activity but it takes a life of its own that is independent of paraceptual theories or any attempt to mirror our other forms of experience. The tongue-in-cheek toast ‘Here is to pure mathematics, may it never be of use to anyone’ and the quip ‘There can be no dispute between pure and applied mathematicians, they cannot talk to each other’ are indicative of the purely conceptual attitude prevalent among pure mathematicians.
This distinction between pure and pre-empirical study in
mathematics goes back long before mathematics became mature conceptual study.
Not only has study within PNDP been mature conceptual science, it has usually included a major amount of pre-empirical science. This is a matter of the significance parameter for those doing Descriptive Psychology, and much of the work has been intended as a basis for paraceptual investigation in the behavioral sciences. Given the dominant paradigms in the behavioral science, this is not surprising. Lacking a net like PNDP, there is little recognition of the restrictive nature of the epistemological presuppositions of most of the work being done. Nor is there an understanding of the role that ordinary basic reliable knowledge could play in clarifying or broadening these paradigms.
My own work in conceptual philosophy has been mostly pure or pre-paraceptual study. Since none of it was done as a preparation for any empirical science, none of it has been pre-empirical science. This is not to say that study in conceptual philosophy cannot be pre-empirical science. If philosophy of science was developed using mature conceptual science then this area of epistemics could be explored either as pure conceptual science or as pre-empirical science. If this were done in order to use these concepts in some area of empirical science then it would be the latter.
A Wider Recognition of PNDP: To realize its potential impact, there are some barriers to a wider recognition of PNDP that need to be considered. After sketching some of them, a few tentative suggestions for undermining these barriers are indicated. This is done primarily to seed further ideas. It is unclear which strategies for undermining these barriers will be effective, and no conjectures about the effectiveness of these suggestions are given.
Attitude Barriers: Widely held epistemic attitudes form a major barrier to the recognition of PNDP. These are attitudes that act as if the primary goal of study is to acquire paraceptual knowledge. Below are four points taken from an email by Paul Zeiger that relate to the bias that supports getting directly to paraceptual results. These apply not only to PNDP, but also to most forms of mature conceptual study. Thus the focus is on barriers to doing mature conceptual study, considering barriers to an appreciation of PNDP as a specific case.
(1) Once the distinction between the conceptual and the paraceptual is made, it ought to be obvious that here are two classes of useful artifacts for which the creation and refinement of one calls for very different methods than creation and refinement of the other. Yet, in putting forward PNDP, it has been uniformly difficult to get listeners to make the distinction in the first place.
(2) Motivation for separating the conceptual from the paraceptual seems to be in short supply. Persons exploring new realms have been very creative in inventing (presumably unconsciously) the conceptual and the paraceptual simultaneously, without distinguishing between them. Look at Relativity, Quantum Theory, Evolution, and Freudian Psychology. So there is a long history of not making the distinction and still doing pretty well (like getting famous).
(3) It appears that when creating a useful conceptual net, the effort goes up faster than linearly in the size of the net. This is a vague conjecture about something easily noticed in the design and construction of programming languages. Many such languages started as elegant means to program a restricted class of data structures and algorithms, and then were added to, bit by bit, in a quest for generality. Usually their creators were unpleasantly surprised by the mounting complexity of conceptual interpretation and machine implementation as the languages grew.
(4) Finally, there is the historical influence of Platonism, This could constitute a pervasive intellectual bias throughout western civilization.
Point 4 indicates a persistent epistemic attitude. It took until the 20th century to overcome this attitude among mathematicians. Even now, most mathematicians still have platonistic attitudes, altho their behavior is mature conceptual study. Gödel’s work is mature conceptual study, but his philosophy insists that mathematics is true for some non-physical platonistic realm. Thus while this platonistic attitude may persist, it does not prevent mature conceptual study. Platonists and formalist and mathematicians with no particular philosophy of mathematics form a community in which in which ontological beliefs or lack of them is not apparent in the mathematics they publish.
Since Point 3 probably indicates an inherent aspect of conceptual study, the number of people doing mature conceptual study for a major realm may always remain small. Altho this may retard a wide recognition and understanding of PNDP, it need not be a major barrier to PNDP having an important impact. Mathematics is poorly understood by most people, but it is still widely used. Physicists can even rely heavily on some remote mathematics with little understanding of PNCM. Even Einstein could not see the significance of the debate about formalism and intuitionism.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn indicates that an established paradigm does not merely give way to a better one. A paradigm shift only occurs in response to anomalies that the standard paradigm cannot handle. The saying ‘Don’t fix it if it isn’t broken’ is a mundane way to express the essence of Point 2. Persons who embrace PNDP are those who realize that something is broken. I suspect that most people do not even consider whether they have an epistemological paradigm, much less a broken one. They see no need to examine their routine net to see if they are using it a manner that is clear and coherent. Even people who have intellectual interests seldom consider whether something in their epistemological paradigm is broken. Most behavioral scientists have not even questioned the epistemological commitments they have largely inherited from positivism, altho the majority of philosophers think these may be broken.
Point 1 may be the greatest barrier, perhaps due largely to what is inherent in having a history of deliberate action. A person acquires concepts by experience in one or more of the social practices that use these concepts. Using concepts to think about concepts is not the main social practice thru which they are acquired. Biologically, intentional action does not even depend on having concepts in focus. Having a history of deliberate action may depend on having concepts, but it does not depended on having a coherent conceptual net. Why would evolution select for persons with nets that were more coherent than is needed to deal with a multitude of ordinary manners? Even mathematics was able to evolve without mature conceptual study.
Not only is conceptual study unnecessary for deliberate action, conceptual study can even interfere with deliberate action. The extent to which a person may find clearer concepts useful depends on that person’s values and purposes. When a person’s purpose is to instill belief rather than foster understanding, having a firm belief may outweigh the value of having clearer concepts that open the possibility of doubt. Altho behind at halftime, a coach may say that the momentum has shifted in our favor. This vague belief may inspire confidence that could actually turn the tide. A player asking the coach to ‘clarify the concept of momentum and how it applies to this situation’ would be considered more than somewhat weird. The purpose of the coach’s statement was to inspire rather than to convey an understanding of the situation.
Point 1 may also be due to the nature and special role played by our routine conceptual net. Unlike a more specialized net, it is permeated with concepts acquired by acting within our realm of certainty. It is especially permeated with our crucial concepts. These are so entwined with each other that it is difficult to bring them into focus for conceptual study. Furthermore most people take them so much for granted that that feel no need to do so.
In relation to the PNDP, these barriers may be especially potent. The area of study for PNDP includes our public routine net, but goes beyond to formulate a net that contains a sophisticated and refined routine net. It provides a net for thinking about any ordinary net as well as being a basis for any special net. Since this involves our realm of certainty and potentially might bring into question some of our basic reliable knowledge, to many it will at best seem to be of limited utility. Conceptual philosophy may seem even more superfluous. Why examine the crucial concepts that we must have in order to do the thing we already do in an adequate manner?
I do not know how many people need to have a functional ability to focus on purely on conceptual distinctions in order for PNDP to have the potential impact I have imagined. Even if the main barriers are attitudinal, I am uncertain about which strategies for undermining the attitude barrier will be effective. The suggestions given in this regard are extremely tentative.
A Capacity Consideration: The ability to understand and effectively use an adequate distinction between conceptual and paraceptual concerns is currently limited to a minority. Perhaps almost everyone has the capacity to acquire this ability, but that most people have not have not had the appropriate history. At one time I would have found this highly plausible. Many people feel that (-1)(-1) = 1 makes no sense. I once thought that this feeling was rooted in paraceptual attitudes that reversed if they could understand how this proposition is purely conceptual. However, even many secondary school mathematics teachers have difficulty understanding this. They give explanations based on models, as if this validates it, rather than merely indicates the utility of the net being used. My experience in teaching, and even in teaching mathematics majors, has made me wonder about the extent of the capacity for conceptual thinking among humans. However, I still treat the above conjecture as at least somewhat plausible, and I will tentatively assume that the primary barriers are rooted in attitudes rather than in capacity.
Connotation Barrier: Another barrier, which may be minor, is the connotations of terminology. When asked about my own work, I hesitantly refer to it as conceptual philosophy. The word philosophy has ordinary connotations that do not apply, and the connotation it has for academics is even more misleading. In a discussion of my net for philosophy of mathematics, a philosophy professor said that it was interesting but he would not call what I was doing philosophy. He suggested psychology of mathematics, which I found even more misleading. While I am not averse to inventing terminology when available terminology seems misleading, I cannot think of anything else to use for what I have called conceptual philosophy. I also hesitate when I tell people I am interested in Descriptive Psychology. Instead I say that I am interested in person concepts. The word ‘psychology’ suggests a limited scope to most people, and ‘descriptive’ does not have the appropriate conceptual connotation for them. Perhaps a different name could found. A rose by any other name ... , but with some other name a person my not bother to smell it. That naming can be a barrier seems implicit in what Ossorio said about presenting a single complex concept in which we can distinguish four major interrelated components.
The overall concept is currently designated as the ‘Human Model’ or ‘Person Concept.’ (At various times I have referred to it as the ‘Behavioral Model,’ ‘Intentional Action System,’ ‘Reality System,’ and ‘Three-system System’. (There does not seem to be a really satisfactory term to use here.) The four major components are the concepts of Reality, Person, Behavior, and Language. The social enterprise of generating and using these and related formulations as technical resources in a behavioral science has been consistently designated as ‘Descriptive Psychology.’
Undermining the Barrier: For most people, the barriers act implicitly rather than explicitly. Lack of appreciation of conceptual nets may be an acquired habit rather than a deliberate commitment to a way of study. This is a reason to think in of terms undermining rather than directly challenging the barriers. The headings below indicate types of strategies and tactics for exposing more people to ways of using PNDP and other types of conceptual study that enhance their lives and further their interests. This includes thinking in terms of both pure conceptual and pre-empirical resources and of both ordinary and scientific conceptual resources. Altho many conceptual resources could also be called resources for Descriptive Psychology, the term conceptual may be initially easier for most people to identify with.
Looking For Allies: To implement the use of conceptual resources, identifying persons or groups who are engaged in reasonable endeavors that may not fit well with the accepted paradigms might be useful. Some institutions feel like the current state of affairs in their realm of interest is in some ways highly unsatisfactory. Identification of such institutions and how conceptual study could be used to enhance behavior potential with in them might be useful. Institutions interested in the realm of education could be especially important. The Association for Constructivist Teaching and the National Home Education Network could be potential allies.
Developing a Wider Variety of Applications: A wealth of sophisticated pre-empirical scientific PNDP resources is already developed and published in Advance in Descriptive Psychology. Altho work, such as the application of PNDP to computer science has been done, much of this work is closely related to the behavioral sciences. In order to find more allies, work showing the utility of conceptual study in a wider variety of areas might be fruitful for the PNDP community. The area of law comes to mind. This might also help the community find allies in some areas not so wedded to the legacy of logical positivism.
Developing Crucial Concepts: PNDP could be expanded by examining more crucial concepts and the concepts these most directly support. This could provide a broader foundation for both pre-empirical scientific work and for socially useful applications. Furthermore it could help insure that the realm of interest for PNDP is as unbounded as indicated earlier.
Fiction: Pure conceptual resources need to be interesting. They also need to transcend the realm that they help access. Fiction exemplifies this. Everything takes place in a realm determined by the author, yet it can affect the reader in a multitude of ways. A wealth of fiction written by persons who understand PNDP and other aspects of pure conceptual study could be a valuable conceptual resource. This does not mean that such fiction should be deliberately written as a resource. Fiction written by persons who understands and appreciates conceptual study would be written for all the usual reasons, but whatever an author appreciates will be reflected to some extent in the author’s fiction.
More Ordinary Uses Altho more could always be done to enhance and organize scientific conceptual resources, these are unlikely to be the main ones that will help most people understand how using conceptual study can enhance their lives and further their interests. Potentially, a wealth of ordinary resources could have the most widespread impact. Ordinary conceptual resources could use some of the most easily understood concepts from PNDP in ways that relate to some common realms of interest. In line with this, these resources could be identified using terminology that people can easily understand. Standard PNDP concepts and terminology could emerge as the resources unfold. Such resources might even encourage behavioral scientist or academic philosophers to begin thinking in terms of PNDP, since these would not be competing directly with their established professional paradigms.
Altho conceptual study ultimately relates to acting more effectively, this is seldom the most noteworthy feature of a person’s significance parameter while doing conceptual study. The most noteworthy aspect is the attempt to enhance nets without regard to any specific paraceptual concerns. Another way to think about this is in terms of behavior perspectives. Studying in order to act more effectively is a prudential reason for behavior. For pure conceptual study, this may be an underlying reason, but it seldom relates directly to what the person is doing. Other reasons are more noteworthy, and the fact that some general perspective is being enhanced is often more important than enhancing any net being considered. Some people enjoy conceptual playfulness and exploring conceptual relationships and making conceptual distinctions. This mixture of hedonic and aesthetic reasons can permeate the study of ordinary nets as much as it permeates the study of more specialized nets.
Conceptual clarification devices, such as using parameters and paradigm cases, are applicable to any realm of interest. The devices themselves can constitute a realm of interest. The concepts involved in conceptual clarification devices can be explained and exemplified in conceptual papers, but like any synthetic concepts, they can best be acquired by experience in social practices that use them. This could be done in a variety of settings that vary from elementary school classrooms to seminars for business managers. The main conceptual resources that would be needed would be persons and materials for implementing these activities.
In general, the primary way of helping people acquire and appreciate ordinary conceptual study and should probably be thru resources at least partially designed for this purpose. These could be purely conceptual or they could have some pre-paraceptual significance. Chicken or Egg is a paper from the conceptual papers section of conceptualstudy.org. It has no pre-paraceptual significance, but might appeal on the basis of conceptual playfulness. Eggs & Rights & Ordinary Nets is more elaborate example, and the part on rights is intended to have pre-paraceptual significance. The eggs part illustrates the potential for complexity in a simple net that centers on concepts that relate very directly to perceptual experience. These egg concepts formed a more complex cluster than might be expected. Altho this could enhance an appreciation of the complexity of simple clusters of concepts and the extensive task involved in clarification of a net, we communicate effectively about eggs without using conceptual study. Except for illustrating ideas, there is no prudential purpose mind. It is primarily an exercise in pure conceptual study, and would be worthwhile mainly to someone already inclined to enjoy this type of conceptual activity.
Education: An extremely important group to reach is children and young people. They need to be encouraged to learn from a more conceptual perspective. Since mathematical ideas are unlikely to conflict with strongly held beliefs, and since mathematics is a coherent net, its study is one place that a conceptual perspective could be acquired. An appreciation of the conceptual nature of mathematics, especially at the level of arithmetic an ordinary algebra, could be related to appreciating PNDP and other aspects of conceptual study. Implementation of this in elementary and secondary schools faces two extraordinary barriers. Standardized testing and a standardized curriculum place the focus elsewhere. Even more significant, most teachers and most parents do not have a conceptual perspective on mathematics. This even includes many secondary mathematics teachers, who focus primarily on the algorithmic aspect of mathematics. Similar remarks apply to the use of conceptual study and to the learning of PNDP concepts in a school setting. This suggests that reaching children also involves reaching adults. In the realm of higher education there is no place where an extensive and varied program of undergraduate and graduate level conceptual study is available. An institute for conceptual study could be established. One of its purposes could be to create an online program centered on conceptual study with PNDP as a major component could be designed.
The Internet: A variety of websites could be used to encourage thinking in terms of both pure conceptual and pre-empirical resources. Websites could be established for a specialized areas of study within the behavioral sciences. The website sdp.org for the society could be used primarily to provide the conceptual resources from PNDP that apply to all the behavioral sciences and to provide links to the specialized websites. It could also provide links to websites that focus on ordinary conceptual resources. The website conceptualstudy.org is one such general purpose website. Other websites might be devoted to special realms of interest, such as some of those alluded to on sdp.org that are included under the heading of where Descriptive Psychology is being used.
Final Comments: This paper conjectured a tremendous potential impact for PNDP. It suggested that PNDP could revolutionize behavioral science to the same extent that mathematics has revolutionized the physical sciences. It even more strongly suggested that PNDP could have a major impact on our routine net. As a result, it imagined that PNDP could be central to a comprehensive paradigm shift suitable for a stable pluralistic world culture, a culture that values tolerance for more than just prudential reasons. Will this potential be realized? Can it be? There are major attitude barriers that are rooted in the history of the way humans deal with their worlds. With further experiences and given the relevant capacity, attitudes can change. The conjectures about the potential impact of PNDP were related to the assumption that the capacity to effectively use the distinction between conceptual and paraceptual concerns is widespread, and that most of the barriers are rooted in attitudes. Certainly more people have this capacity than have this ability. Even if the main barriers are attitudinal, its seems uncertain which strategies for undermining the attitude barrier will be effective. Suggestions in this regard should be extremely tentative and open to revision. How much effort will be involved? How long may it take? It seems reasonable to assume that it will at least take the dedicated effort of a number of people and that the impact will not occur in the near future.
APPENDIX MORE ABOUT CONCEPTUAL PHILOSPHY
Three Subnets of Conceptual Philosophy: Altho all concepts in a fundamental net are interrelated, it is convenient for organizational purposes to think in terms of some intertwined subnets that can be the focus of study without extensive use of any concepts that are not essential to their real of interest. Ontics is the subnet that focuses on a purely conceptual study of reality concepts. Its concern is on the concepts that might be useful in thinking about reality. Epistemics is the subnet that focuses on a purely conceptual study of understanding. Enactics (named by John Pais) is the subnet that focuses on doing. This subnet permeates the others, for the very concept of a person is centered on what a person does.
Altho drafts of my work in conceptual philosophy were completed before I became aware of PNDP, I have now integrated portions of PNDP into a conceptual philosophy. Almost all of this work is included in my book entitled A Personal Approach to Conceptual Philosophy. Since crucial concepts are at the core of a routine net, this seems appropriate. In fact, PNDP already includes an extensive amount of what I would include in the strand on doing. It also includes portions of ontics and epistemics. I have integrated concepts from PNDP into my work in each of these strands.
I consider the reality concepts from PNDP as the core of ontics, and integrate them with other concepts to the extent that I am not inclined to go beyond the ontics in Part 1 of that book. Altho this includes all the crucial ontic concepts that I have thought about, others might want to go further. More work can always be done on the concepts most directly supported by these concepts.
Enactics is the strand that relies most heavily on concepts from PNDP. The utility of PNDP for this purpose is due to the fact that the person concept is central to PNDP, and this concept is linked to the concept of deliberate action. My work in enactics goes beyond the current concepts because of concerns that may be of very little interest to others, altho one strand that could be of general interest is the net for human ethics that is partially developed in Part 3 Chapter 4.
The epistemic subnet relies heavily on the conceptual clarification devices from PNDP. However, except for linguistic concepts, the epistemic portion of PNDP is not extensive enough for my purposes. One epistemic topic that I have considered is a parametric perspective on the mastery of concepts. Chapter 2 of A Net for Conceptual Philosophy and all of A Net for Understanding gives an overview of the other epistemic strands I would include. The concept of understanding is my most crucial epistemic concept.
Understanding: The concept of knowledge is often taken as the focus of epistemics. I prefer to think of the central its central crucial concept as understanding. Various types of knowledge and comprehension are components of understanding. Propositional knowledge is the kind of knowledge that can be expressed by propositions. It includes any information that P reasonably finds believable and that P is willing to use as a basis for some type of action. Process knowledge and realm knowledge are also components of understanding. Process knowledge is the type of knowledge that is acquired thru practice and that enables an actor to implement various processes. It includes the cognitive aspects of P’s action capabilities, or the cognitive aspect of P’s competence. Realm knowledge is the knowledge of a realm that is obtained by living within that realm. It includes propositional and process knowledge as components but is much broader. It cannot be reduced to a set of component parts. It is the kind of knowledge that we have in mind when we say that a reporter really knows city hall. It is the basis needed for powerful understanding of concepts for a realm. Simple comprehension involves understanding some basic aspect of something without a noteworthy focus on its relationships to anything else. Relational comprehension involves understanding relationships between concepts. It is essential to having well integrated concepts. Relational comprehension also involves an understanding of relationships in various states of affairs that are not purely conceptual, such as understanding the relationship between nutrition and health. Unlike propositional knowledge, which can often be expressed using simple propositions, relational comprehension can vary from minimal to extremely sophisticated.
Validation of Basic Reliable Knowledge: P can challenge or consider challenges to parts of P’s basic reliable knowledge. P can look for ways to validate or ground these parts. For most purposes, there is no good reason for P to challenge or validate such knowledge. Altho I could provide evidence beyond a reliance on memory of having never been on Mars, I would need to have some unusual reasons to do so. This is basic reliable knowledge, altho I may never need to rely on it. Much more useful would be my basic reliable knowledge about the location of my house. This is so basic and so reliable that even in dreams I am tremendously disturbed when it seems to be unreliable. In fact, when this happens, I may even realize that I am dreaming. Still I can imagine questioning this and providing additional evidence to validate it to anyone with doubts. One thing I cannot imagine doubting is that my concept of location is meaningful. What would it be like to claim that all human talk about locations was meaningless? How would you make sense out of such a claim? How would you validate your certainty that the concept of location was meaningful? Imaging responding to someone who said the concept of location is meaningless because spatial relationships do not exist.
Vital knowledge: P’s vital knowledge is the basic reliable knowledge that P cannot seriously doubt and still make sense of being a person in the real world. All of P’s other knowledge presupposes P’s vital knowledge (and usually some other certainties). For P to seriously challenge P’s vital knowledge, P must seriously challenge P’s ability to understand anything. To challenge your vital knowledge is to assume that you might be totally incompetent, that your crucial concepts are incoherent. This is the ultimate degradation ceremony. For example, that P’s memory is at least somewhat reliable is vital knowledge for P. Even with amnesia, P could not function without the knowledge that the memories being accumulated will be somewhat reliable.
Knowing that we exist in the real world is vital. I regard Descartes’ argument for this not as a proof but as recognizing that this is vital knowledge. A science fiction story illustrates this. The main character walks beyond a permissible point in the road and finds that the world suddenly ends in nothingness. He later discovers that he is a simulated person in a computer program that is still being written. Try to imagine being this person. Perhaps “brain in a vat” discussions that some philosophers find so interesting are a way to bring a concept of vital knowledge into focus. I suspect not, because it is taken too seriously, so the significance of such discussions escapes me. It also seems to implicitly assume a physicalistic cosmic version, for otherwise why not imagine being a thought in the mind of a metaphysical demon.
APPENDIX: THE EVOLUTION OF MY PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
Mathematics and Conceptual Philosophy: It was the evolution of my mathematical understanding that prepared the way for me to focus on conceptual philosophy and to later easily appreciate the potential impact of PNDP. My earlier philosophies of mathematics were mixed with and dependent on ontological and epistemological beliefs. It was not until I formulated a net for philosophy of mathematics that I was able to liberate my self from such presuppositions. Except for ordinary claim of competence, this net rests on conceptual prerequisites rather than presuppositions. In particular, this net must be understood as a subnet of a net for understanding mathematics and as interrelated with a net for conceptual philosophy. Like any net, it uses routine net concepts. Shaping a philosophy of mathematics was a journey in which it changed from a kind of platonic rationalism to a purely conceptual net. My search evolved from a search for foundations to a search for broader perspectives, a net to help organize my thinking about mathematics rather than to provide answers about the nature or foundations of mathematics. This attitude is like my current attitude toward conceptual philosophy. I want a net to provide orientation rather than answers. My philosophy of mathematics is not a system of claims or beliefs. It cannot be correct or incorrect, altho some of my conceptual claims might involve conceptual errors. As a conceptual tool, it is judged by its utility in relation to my purposes. To what extent does it provide or fail to provide concepts that give a perspective for studying mathematics? Is it loose enough to not unduly restrict my thinking, tight enough to provide structure, rich enough to help me expand my mathematical perspective? Does it serve my purposes better than any alternative I can now understand?
My philosophy of mathematics began as a kind of platonic rationalism that I now sketch. Mathematics is a way of reasoning, namely pure and precise deductive reasoning. The universe is a rational structure, and mathematical reasoning is about the essence of this structure. Mathematics is the most powerful method we can use to obtain systematic knowledge about any aspect of our experience. Careful reasoning depends on the development of a language with exact rules and unambiguous meanings. The immediate subject matter of mathematics is the structure of such a language and the reasoning that can be done within it. The ultimate goal is to search for a language powerful enough to express all ideas, to search for a set of axioms within this language which can provide a basis for the deduction of all true statements, to begin to develop a system of theorems from these axioms. Unlike a science, mathematics is not restricted to the study of some special aspect of out experience. Currently mathematics may only cover a few aspects of experience, such as our experience of quantity or our experience of spatial relations, but mathematics can be continually expanded to cover more aspect of our experience. This is because the universe, being a rational structure, has basic principles that are accessible thru pure reason. Most sciences are in a primitive stage of development, relying heavily on empirical methods. Ultimately they should all evolve according to the pattern exemplified by the evolution of geometry, which began as a study of spatial relationships. This study was at first conducted in ordinary language, with its ambiguous meanings and irregularities. The Greeks purged geometry of most empirical methods, transforming it into deductive reasoning. They also began to create a precise geometric language. Descartes initiated a process that transforming geometry from an isolated deductive system into part of a more comprehensive one. All geometric notions can defined in numerical terms, and since all numerical concepts can be defined using concepts from set theory, geometry is now a branch of set theory.
My rationalistic philosophy was challenged when learned about some mathematical results that cast doubts on the ubiquitous power of mathematical reason. My perspective on non-euclidean geometry helped me realize that it was conceptually possible to create a variety of equally consistent geometries, and that any of these might eventually be useful in the study of physical spaces. I could no longer regard the universe as a rational structure whose basic principles are accessible thru pure reason. I decided to call myself a formalist, however my formalism retained many features of my previous philosophy. I still thought of mathematics primarily as a way of thinking. I still considered mathematics as applicable, at least potentially, to all aspects of experience. I still thought that the subject matter of mathematics centered on exact language and deductive consequences of axioms. I was a formalist, rather than a rationalist, because I no longer wanted my philosophy of mathematics entangled with epistemology or ontology. I did not want a philosophy dependent on the universe being a rational structure or on reason being a ubiquitous method of knowing. I had become agnostic about broad ontological claims, and I had decided that reason was only directly applicable to the abstract creations of the human imagination. While I still considered reason as powerful, I no longer considered it as a method that by itself could yield paraceptual information. Formalism allowed me to understand mathematics as an activity free from epistemological and ontological commitments, and thus as a basis which might provide a perspective on ontics and epistemics. Formalism allowed me greater latitude for both belief and skepticism. It liberated me from a narrow rationalistic epistemology, while allowing me to regard mathematical thinking as powerful, but also allowing an essential role for other methods in the search for systematic knowledge about the world.
Later I realized that altho my formalism had liberated me from most ontological and epistemological commitments, it had encumbered me with some strong ontological and epistemological restrictions. I was not to admit the mathematical existence of anything except definite classes of inscriptions. I was not to use any concept of mathematical truth that was not purely constructive. These restrictions ran counter to my actual behavior, and thus as a formalist I had to think of mathematics as being surrounded by a huge imaginary realm of fantasy or pseudo-mathematics. When I finally admitted that I was more interested in this imaginary realm than in formal systems alone, it seemed silly not to classify both as mathematics. I had become a formalist because I knew that mathematical activity was largely prior to ontology and epistemology. When I found formalism making restrictions on my mathematical activity, I decided that this philosophy had become a liability rather than an asset. I had no coherent philosophy of mathematics to replace my formalism, but I decided that I preferred a chaotic net that would confront me with my confusion, rather than a systematic net that would screen me from it. Whatever philosophy of mathematics I might create, I vowed that it would reflect mathematical practice, rather than call for restrictions upon it.
After shaping the core of a net for conceptual philosophy, I was able to shape MNPM (a net for philosophy of mathematics) as pluralistic conceptual net. I consider my previous philosophies of mathematics as a kind of support system for a mathematical net that could not stand on its own. By focusing on mathematics as a special kind of CS, MNPM needs no such support. Indeed, it would find such support a burden. While MNPM uses much of my earlier perspectives, it involves differences in attitude and a broadening of them. In the past, I had expected philosophy to explain the essential nature of mathematics. I now expect to obtain better perspectives on the nature of mathematics primarily by becoming a better mathematician. At most, MNPM can provide a net for thinking about the nature of mathematics, thus indirectly helping me become a better mathematician. MNPM is a network of conceptual strands. These strands are not all analytic. Some are subceptual and even intertwined with the most ubiquitous strands in my total net. I need broader conceptual methods to deal with them.
MNPM begins by observing that it is easy to classify certain human activities as mathematical. Such judgements are reliable, in the sense that mathematicians would normally agree about them. What is involved in doing mathematics? For a partial answer to this question, consider some of the main features we can observe in mathematical activities. Central features include: solving, abstracting, defining, proving, intuiting. These features are intertwined with a variety of other features such as imagining sets along with relations or functions, creating notation, examining the consequences of axioms, constructing outlines for formal systems, posing problems, looking for examples, calculating, designing algorithms, groping for perspective, having flashes of insight. There is both a unity and diversity running thru this cluster. My pluralistic response about the methodology of mathematics is a decision not to force a unity that is false to my experience.
When I want to use a single phrase to refer my mathematical activities, I simply say that mathematics is conceptual study. However, not all CS is classified as mathematical. CS in mathematics relies heavily on axiomatic methods, but this includes reasoning in a broad sense, in ways that go beyond any logic that has been formalized. Strict deductions are mathematical, but inarticulate groping is also mathematical if guided by a desire for intuitive insight or clarity. At present a pointing technique is the best way I know to indicate to myself what I mean by CS in mathematics, for I am not prepared to specify criteria which would indicate its use more precisely. I am guided primarily by a desire to speak in such a way that CS includes at least all the thinking I find important as I do mathematics.
The word ‘mathematics’ is not only used to indicate a special type of conceptual activity, but also to indicate subject matters on which such activity centers. The core subject matter of contemporary mathematics is a collection of nets whose main concepts are remote and can be significantly formalized. I use the term ‘math net’ to refer to any such net. My comments about math nets and conceptual study only point toward the main strands I use in thinking about the nature of mathematics. For a somewhat deeper view of these strands I examine how math net relates to my ontic and epistemic nets, and even more important how it helps me think about studying mathematics. MNPM is being developed further, where it belongs, namely in the context of its use. MNPM develops as I use it to study mathematics.
Side Remark on Appreciating PNCM: Richard Feynman gave an imaginary account of the interaction between a mathematician M and scientist S talking about linear algebra. I heard this in a film I once saw. I could not locate it, so my account may only be accurate in spirit. S asks M about 3-dimeisnional vector spaces. When M tells S that there is no reason to limit vectors spaces to 3 dimensions, S replies that those are the only dimensions needed for physics. When relativity emerges, S come back to M and says now I need to here what you have to say about 4-dimensional vector spaces. Again, M wants to talk about more dimensions, indicating that vector spaces do not even need to be finite dimensional. S ignores these comments as not being relevant to physics. Quantum theory emerges, and S returns to M, asking, what was it you wanted to tell me about infinite dimensional vector spaces? Incidentally, using vector spaces of various dimensions provides an elegant approach to resolving the 2000-year-old angle trisection problem.